Rachel H. v. Department of Education
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16508
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Rachel H., a student with Down syndrome, had an IEP in May 2012 that provided services and stated the IEP would be “implemented on a public school campus,” but did not name a specific school.
- At the time, parties understood Kalani High School to be the implementing campus; Rachel’s parents refused to sign the IEP and later moved to Kailua.
- The DOE declined to continue funding private tuition, told parents the IEP was not specific to Kalani, requested the new address to determine an appropriate Kailua school, and warned unilateral private enrollment would be at parents’ expense.
- Parents filed a due-process complaint (and later suit) claiming the IEP was deficient because it failed to identify the anticipated school in Kailua, alleging a procedural IDEA violation; they did not challenge substantive services in the IEP.
- Administrative officer and district court held the IDEA does not always require naming a specific school as part of the IEP; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the IDEA’s IEP “location” requirement always must identify the specific school where services will be delivered | "Location" means the anticipated specific school; omission is a procedural IDEA violation denying FAPE | "Location" can mean the type of environment (e.g., regular class, resource room); naming a specific school is not always required | "Location" does not necessarily require naming a particular school; no per se violation for omission |
| Whether DOE’s July 2012 letter predetermines placement or steers IEP without an IEP meeting | The July letter forced placement in a Kailua public high school without IEP team consideration, constituting predetermination | The May IEP already determined needs could be met on a public campus; applying that IEP in Kailua follows transfer procedures rather than predetermination | No predetermination: applying the existing IEP in the new district followed statutory transfer procedure |
| Whether failure to name a school automatically entitles parents to unilateral private placement at public expense | Omission is procedural defect sufficient to justify reimbursement for unilateral private placement | Procedural omission alone does not justify unilateral private placement absent substantive denial of FAPE | Procedural omission alone insufficient; parents cannot use technical omission to obtain unilateral placement reimbursement |
| Whether naming a school may be required in some cases given child-specific needs | Parents argue specific facilities/classroom info can be necessary for meaningful participation and for assessing adequacy | DOE acknowledges naming can be appropriate when required by a child’s disability or where meaningful participation demands it | Court: naming may be required in particular circumstances, but not a blanket statutory requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (establishes baseline FAPE framework)
- Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable appropriate progress)
- K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110 (discusses predetermination and IEP placement issues)
- Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (IEP must offer an appropriate placement; site-specific adequacy may matter)
- T.Y. ex rel. T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412 (supports view that "location" may mean general environment rather than specific site)
- A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672 (identifying a school can be necessary for parents’ meaningful participation)
- R.L. ex rel. O.L. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 757 F.3d 1173 (placement site selection typically within district discretion)
- White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373 ("location" primarily administrative; does not guarantee parental right to site selection)
- Abney ex rel. Kantor v. District of Columbia, 849 F.2d 1491 (IEP not location-specific; implementation site may change without altering the IEP)