Rachael Boseman v. Upper Providence Township
680 F. App'x 65
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- On April 11, 2014, Officer Patrick Reynolds stopped and arrested Rachel Boseman for DUI after observing alleged signs of intoxication; Boseman disputes most of his observations and says she had not consumed alcohol that day.
- Reynolds reported odor of alcohol, glassy/blood-shot eyes, slurred speech, and a failed field sobriety test; Boseman admits only a possibly flushed face due to a skin condition.
- At the station Reynolds provided O’Connell warnings in writing but allegedly prevented Boseman from submitting to a blood test and later announced she had refused testing; Boseman contends she agreed to testing but was not permitted.
- Boseman was charged, rejected a pretrial diversion offer, was tried and acquitted; the Pennsylvania DOT nonetheless sought license suspension based on the alleged refusal to test.
- Boseman sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence claims), Monell claim against the township, and state-law claims (malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault and battery); the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and granted a motion to strike certain paragraphs.
- On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims and Monell claim, but vacated and remanded the state-law false imprisonment and assault/battery claims for further proceedings (or dismissal without prejudice).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution (§ 1983) | Reynolds initiated prosecution without probable cause and with malice | There was probable cause and plaintiff failed to plead malice with factual detail | Dismissed: plaintiff failed to plead malice (element four) beyond a conclusory allegation |
| Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence (§ 1983) | Reynolds fabricated or withheld evidence in report, leading to charge | Disputed observations are not fabrication; no persuasive allegations of bad-faith fabrication | Dismissed: allegations were conclusory and amount to a he-said/she-said dispute, not the high bar for fabrication claims |
| Monell municipal-liability claim | Township tolerated/custom of boilerplate false allegations and failed to train/supervise | No underlying constitutional violation plausibly pleaded; cited incidents immaterial or showed convictions/diversions | Dismissed: because plaintiff did not adequately plead a constitutionally caused injury by municipal policy or custom |
| State-law false imprisonment & assault and battery | Arrest was without probable cause and force may have been unreasonable | Probable cause disputed; defendants pointed to official procedures and prior state-court actions | Vacated & remanded: factual disputes about probable cause and force mean these claims should proceed (district court may retain supplemental jurisdiction or dismiss without prejudice) |
Key Cases Cited
- Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014) (fabrication-of-evidence framework and requiring persuasive evidence of bad faith)
- Black v. Montgomery Cty., 835 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2016) (acquitted defendant may pursue fabrication claim if fabricated evidence likely caused charging; high bar for fabrication)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom that causes a constitutional violation)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: conclusory allegations insufficient to survive dismissal)
- Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994) (probable cause and reasonableness of force govern false imprisonment and assault/battery in arrests)