Raby v. Davis, 907 F.3d 880

Raby was convicted of capital murder in Texas (1994), sentenced to death, and state courts denied relief; federal habeas was denied for failure to exhaust and this court previously denied a COA on procedural-foreclosure/merits grounds.
After additional state habeas attempts, Raby filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion seeking to reopen the federal judgment to litigate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims based on counsel's failure to present mitigation and calling psychologist Walter Quijano, who called Raby a "psychopath."
The district court denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief, finding no extraordinary circumstances to reopen the judgment; Raby sought a COA to appeal that denial.
Raby invoked intervening Supreme Court decisions (Martinez/Trevino) creating a narrow exception to Coleman for defaulted IAC claims when state habeas counsel was ineffective, arguing the change in law and his facts were extraordinary.
The district court and this panel held that a change in decisional law alone is not an "extraordinary circumstance" for Rule 60(b)(6), and that the facts here (Quijano's testimony labeling Raby a psychopath) are materially distinct from Buck v. Davis's racial-discrimination context.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted based on intervening change in law (Martinez/Trevino)	Martinez/Trevino create a narrow Coleman exception that now allows review of Raby's defaulted IAC claims, so the change is an extraordinary circumstance	Change in decisional law alone does not constitute extraordinary circumstances to reopen a final judgment	Denied — change in law alone is insufficient for Rule 60(b)(6) relief
Whether the specific facts (Quijano calling Raby a "psychopath" and counsel's mitigation failures) are extraordinary under Rule 60(b)(6)	Quijano's testimony and counsel's failures present extraordinary circumstances akin to Buck (prejudicial expert testimony)	Buck involved racial discrimination and systemic injury; Raby's allegations do not reach that level or show community-wide pernicious injury	Denied — facts here are not analogous to Buck and do not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances
Whether equitable/Seven Elves factors require reopening the judgment	Equity favors reconsideration because merits of defaulted IAC claims were never addressed on the merits and Raby was diligent	The court previously assessed the claims' merits for COA purposes; finality, comity, and federalism emphasize reluctance to reopen habeas judgments	Denied — equitable factors do not overcome the high Rule 60(b)(6) threshold in habeas context

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (procedural requirement and standard for certificate of appealability)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (procedural default doctrine)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (narrow exception to Coleman for IAC claims when state postconviction counsel was ineffective)
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (applying Martinez in Texas procedural context)
Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (prejudicial expert testimony involving race can constitute extraordinary circumstances)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (limits on Rule 60(b) in habeas proceedings)
Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370 (Fifth Circuit denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief despite diligence)