Raap v. Wolf Point School Dist., 414 P.3d 788

Kristine Raap was a one-year teacher whose superintendent recommended mid-year termination; the Board held a Dec. 22, 2015 meeting to consider termination after Raap filed an EEOC complaint that was referred to the Montana Human Rights Bureau.
At the hearing Raap waived privacy and attended with her union representative; the Board chair nonetheless closed the meeting citing protection of "individual privacy of statements and information for those not in attendance."
After testimony, the Board briefly re-opened, moved to terminate, then closed the meeting again for an 11-minute "executive session" described as litigation strategy with the Board's counsel; Raap and her union rep were excluded from that session.
The Board then voted to terminate Raap without further public deliberation; counsel later averred the executive session concerned explanation of the HRB/EEOC complaint and the process to follow and did not include deliberation on termination.
Raap sued under Montana's open meeting law (§ 2-3-203, MCA) and Article II, § 9 of the Montana Constitution, seeking to void the termination; the District Court granted summary judgment to the Board and Raap appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Board lawfully closed the hearing portion based on third-party privacy rights	Raap: closure was a cursory reference to unnamed third parties and insufficient to meet the burden to overcome the presumption of openness	Board: closure justified to protect unnamed third-party privacy (possible students/staff/parents) and no need to identify individuals	Court: Reversed — Board's stated rationale was too vague and it failed to make the particularized showing required to overcome presumption of openness
Whether exclusion from the 11-minute executive session was lawful under the litigation-strategy exception (§ 2-3-203(4)(a))	Raap: Board offered no showing that the executive session related to litigation strategy or that openness would harm litigating position	Board: labeled the session "litigation strategy" with counsel and relied on counsel's affidavit describing an explanation of the complaint/process	Court: Reversed — record lacked a showing that the closed session concerned strategy whose disclosure would harm the Board's litigating position

Great Falls Tribune v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876 (Mont. 2003) (framework for analyzing Article II, § 9 right to observe deliberations)
State ex rel. Smith v. Dist. Ct., 654 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1982) (recognized exceptions to openness for fair trial rights)
Great Falls Tribune v. Dist. Ct., 608 P.2d 116 (Mont. 1980) (speedy and fair trial rights can justify closure)
Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. Bozeman Police Dept., 859 P.2d 435 (Mont. 1993) (third-party privacy expectations in investigatory contexts)
Goyen v. City of Troy, 915 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1996) (council closures and the need to notify persons whose privacy is implicated)
Moe v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 371 P.3d 415 (Mont. 2016) (upholding closure where government made particularized showing of identifiable third-party privacy interests)
Billings Gazette v. City of Billings, 313 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2013) (analysis of subjective and objective privacy expectations)
Goetz, State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008) (test for reasonable expectation of privacy)
T.L.S. v. Mont. Advocacy Program, 144 P.3d 818 (Mont. 2006) (burden is on public body to show closure justified)
Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831 (Mont. 2014) (standing to challenge open-meeting violations)
Ihnot v. Ihnot, 999 P.2d 303 (Mont. 2000) (district courts must provide sufficient findings to permit appellate review)
Beach v. State, 220 P.3d 667 (Mont. 2009) (court must independently evaluate claims and record)