R.W. v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1260

Background

Student with diagnosed schizophrenia enrolled at Georgia State University (GSU) in Spring 2013; disclosed diagnosis during health-center visit and met with GSU Counseling & Testing Center (CTC) clinicians.
After a clinical interview where clinicians observed behavior they regarded as possible psychosis, CTC staff initiated a safety check and arranged transport to Grady Hospital; Grady did not find criteria for involuntary commitment.
Dean of Students (Dr. Stout), based on CTC evaluations (including a report by Dr. Lee‑Barber), referred the student to a mandated risk screening and issued a March 15, 2013 letter imposing conditions (treatment, releases, monthly reporting); parties dispute whether the letter also conditionally affected enrollment or only housing.
Plaintiff remained enrolled and in campus housing through Spring 2013 but alleges he was effectively excluded from campus housing thereafter and must submit to future risk screenings to return; he sued under Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Lower-court motions: plaintiff moved to strike portions of Dr. Lee‑Barber’s declaration; defendant moved to exclude plaintiff’s experts (psychiatrist Dr. Agharkar and student‑affairs expert Jason Ebbeling); both motions to exclude and the motion to strike were denied.
The court denied both parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment because material factual disputes remain on direct‑threat, whether actions were by reason of disability, and whether enrollment conditions existed; remedies (injunctive and compensatory damages) remain for trial considerations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dr. Lee‑Barber must be disclosed as an expert under Rule 26	Her testimony is factual/treatment‑based and explains decision‑making, so not an undisclosed expert	It constitutes expert medical testimony that required disclosure	Denied motion to strike; treating clinician’s explanatory lay opinion permitted, but objections to testimony beyond that role remain viable at trial
Admissibility of Dr. Agharkar (psychiatry expert)	Qualified in forensic psychiatry; methodology reliable (peer‑reviewed literature, NCHERM rubric); testimony helps factfinder on risk/ discrimination	Not sufficiently qualified on social‑policy questions; methodology unreliable; offers legal conclusions	Motion to exclude denied; court found qualifications, reliability, and usefulness adequate; cautioned against legal‑conclusion testimony
Admissibility of Jason Ebbeling (student‑affairs expert)	Experienced student‑affairs practitioner/scholar; opinions on risk assessment practices and OCR direct‑threat framework assist jury	Lacks legal qualification; unreliable methodology; may offer impermissible legal conclusions	Motion to exclude denied; court found qualifications and methodology adequate; legal conclusions remain for the court, but background and factual‑framework testimony admissible
Whether sovereign immunity bars ADA/RA claims against state university	ADA Title II abrogates state immunity; RA waiver applies where federal funds accepted	Defendant urged revisiting Eleventh Circuit precedent and contended abrogation requires showing constitutional violation	Sovereign immunity abrogation under Title II upheld (Eleventh Circuit precedent controlling); RA waiver of immunity applies because defendant accepts federal funds
Whether plaintiff is a "qualified individual" (direct‑threat defense)	Plaintiff contends no objective evidence of danger; stayed in school with no disciplinary history	GSU relied on clinicians’ observations, records, and individualized assessment indicating risk in unsupervised housing	Material factual disputes on nature, probability, severity, duration of risk; summary judgment denied to both sides
Whether actions were "by reason of" disability (discrimination)	Actions were motivated by schizophrenia diagnosis and thus discriminatory	Actions were safety‑based, nondiscriminatory, and grounded in clinical concern	Disputed factual record (records, letters, and testimony show mixed reasons); summary judgment denied
Availability of remedies (injunction, compensatory damages)	Seeks injunction to remove monitoring conditions and restore housing; seeks monetary relief and emotional distress	Defendant argues no discrimination and high standard (deliberate indifference) required for damages	Injunctive relief and damages remain viable; deliberate‑indifference standard applies to monetary damages and factual issues remain for jury/trier

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court must gatekeep expert evidence for relevance and reliability)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony; court has latitude in reliability inquiry)
Ass'n for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Florida Int'l Univ., 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005) (Title II abrogation of state sovereign immunity valid as applied to public universities)
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (scope of Congress’s §5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title II abrogation issues)
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (standards for congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity)
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (direct‑threat analysis requires objective assessment based on medical evidence)
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (factors for direct‑threat analysis and student context guidance)
Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012) (deliberate indifference required to recover compensatory damages under §504/ADA)
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (standards for permanent injunctions)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden shifting and movant’s initial showing)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine dispute of material fact standard for summary judgment)