R. Scott Phelan v. H. Scott Norville
10-16-00187-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 26, 2017Background
- R. Scott Phelan (plaintiff) sued H. Scott Norville (defendant) for assault and defamation; a jury initially awarded $590,000. Texas Tech University was dismissed earlier by summary judgment.
- The trial judge who presided over the jury trial accepted an adjunct-professor position at Texas Tech School of Law during the litigation; later the trial judge granted judgment n.o.v. in part, reducing the verdict for mental anguish.
- On appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals heard argument at Texas Tech School of Law; while the appeal was pending, all four appellate justices signed agreements to be adjunct professors there. The court reversed on the libel claim, reducing Phelan’s recovery to $15,000; Texas Tech paid Norville’s judgment.
- Phelan learned of the judges’ adjunct appointments and filed a bill of review seeking to set aside the judgments, alleging judicial wrongdoing, nondisclosure, and need for recusal; the trial court denied the bill of review.
- The trial court found insufficient evidence that the judges’ adjunct employment influenced their decisions, concluded a recusal motion would likely have been denied, and articulated the standard for a bill of review (meritorious claim; prevention by fraud/official mistake; absence of petitioner’s fault).
- Phelan appealed the denial; the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court imposed a “conscious wrongdoing” standard or erred in its recusal/disqualification and ethics findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Phelan proved the elements of a bill of review (meritorious claim; prevented by fraud/official mistake; unmixed with his own fault) | Phelan argued the judges’ adjunct hires were wrongful/official acts that prevented him from obtaining relief | Norville/others argued adjunct hires alone do not show wrongful acts or official mistake preventing Phelan’s claims | Court: Phelan failed to prove prevention by fraud/wrongful act or official mistake; bill of review denied and affirmed on appeal |
| Whether the trial court improperly required proof of “conscious” wrongdoing | Phelan contended the court demanded proof of conscious intent to influence decisions | Respondents said the court applied standard bill-of-review elements and merely found no conscious wrongdoing in the record | Court: No extra "conscious"-wrongdoing requirement was imposed; trial court merely found no evidence of it; overrules this complaint |
| Whether nondisclosure of adjunct appointments would have required recusal or disqualification | Phelan argued disclosure would have led to recusal and different adjudicators and outcomes | Respondents argued disclosure would not have supported recusal and a recusal motion likely would have been denied; adjunct hires are common and not per se disqualifying | Court: Trial court’s factual finding that a recusal motion would likely have been denied is supported; no basis for disqualification; overrules recusal-related issues |
| Whether the judges violated judicial-ethics standards affecting the bill of review | Phelan argued adjunct employment and alleged ex parte communications violated ethics and affected impartiality | Respondents noted no evidence showing the appointments influenced rulings and ethics violations were not adjudicated in bill-of-review proceedings | Court: Ethical-violation claim not proven in record; trial court reasonably found no evidence the appointments caused oath violations; issues overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. 2004) (elements and purpose of a bill of review)
- Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1979) (bill-of-review elements and standards)
- Perez v. Old West Capital Co., 411 S.W.3d 66 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013) (standard for reviewing findings of fact and conclusions of law)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (high threshold for judicial recusal based on alleged bias)
- Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910 (Tex.App.—Waco 2007) (objective test for whether a reasonable member of the public would doubt a judge’s impartiality)
