R. Nercesian, Jr. v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing
R. Nercesian, Jr. v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing - 1795 C.D. 2016
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Jun 12, 2017Background
- Licensee (Nercesian) pled guilty March 26, 2016 to leaving the scene of an accident (75 Pa. C.S. § 3743); statute (75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(b)(1)) requires a six‑month suspension upon Bureau receipt of a certified conviction record.
- Delaware County Office of Judicial Services (OJS) certified the conviction to the Bureau on August 2, 2016; the Bureau mailed suspension notice on August 10, 2016.
- Licensee testified he believed his suspension began on the plea date, stopped driving for ~5 months, and only learned by the August 10 letter that the suspension had not yet gone into effect and that he needed to surrender his license.
- Licensee appealed; the trial court (de novo hearing Sept. 27, 2016) sustained the appeal and reinstated driving privileges, finding the delay unreasonable and prejudicial to Licensee.
- The Commonwealth Court reversed, holding: the delay attributable to the Bureau was de minimis (eight days between certification and mail); the longer lapse was due to OJS and did not meet the narrow “extraordinary circumstances” exception from Gingrich.
Issues
| Issue | Nercesian's Argument | DOT/Bureau's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the delay between conviction and suspension was an "unreasonable delay" warranting reinstatement | Delay between plea and notice led him reasonably to believe he was already serving suspension and he was prejudiced (business harm) | Majority of delay was due to OJS, not Bureau; only eight days attributable to Bureau — no unreasonable Bureau delay | Reversed: no unreasonable delay chargeable to Bureau; judicial/clerical delay alone insufficient absent extraordinary circumstances |
| Whether technological/evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports finding Bureau unreasonable for not obtaining/receiving certification faster | Argued equity and due process, relying on Supreme Court discussion about ease of obtaining warrants due to technology | Bureau: Fourth Amendment search/warrant jurisprudence is inapposite to statutory, binary suspension regime | Rejected: Fourth Amendment cases (Birchfield/McNeely/Riley) are poor analogies; statutory suspension is a remedial, non‑discretionary process governed by statute |
| Whether Gingrich creates an exception when delay is court/clerk attributable | Licensee relied on equitable considerations described by trial court | Bureau argued Gingrich requires extraordinary, lengthy delay and factual showing | Court: Gingrich limited to extraordinary circumstances; five‑month gap here not extraordinary, so Gingrich does not help Licensee |
| Whether prejudice shown by Licensee (business harm) suffices to overturn suspension | Claimed reliance and business hardship if six‑month suspension imposed now | Bureau argued reliance insufficient where delay not Bureau‑caused and statutory framework controls | Held: Prejudice alone insufficient where delay not chargeable to Bureau and not extraordinary under precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Terraciano v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 753 A.2d 233 (Pa. 2000) (elements for unreasonable‑delay relief and prejudice requirement)
- Gingrich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 134 A.3d 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (court‑delay exception limited to extraordinary, extended delays)
- Green v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 546 A.2d 767 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (judicial‑system delay generally does not invalidate suspensions absent Bureau fault)
- Pokoy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 714 A.2d 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (delay mostly attributable to court clerk does not entitle licensee to relief)
- Capizzi v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 141 A.3d 635 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (very long post‑conviction delay can be unreasonable despite court attribution)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (Fourth Amendment warrant/search‑incident‑to‑arrest analyses regarding blood vs. breath tests)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (no per se exigency for warrantless blood draws despite metabolization concerns)
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (U.S. 2014) (cellphone searches incident to arrest require warrant; technological ease of obtaining warrants discussed)