R.M.A. (a Minor Child), by his Next Friend: Rachelle Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV School District and Blue Springs School District Board of Education
568 S.W.3d 420
Mo.2019Background
- R.M.A., a minor who alleges his legal sex is male though born female and is transgender, filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights in Oct. 2014 and received a right-to-sue in July 2015.
- In Oct. 2015 R.M.A. sued Blue Springs R-IV School District and its Board under Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) § 213.065, alleging he was denied access to boys’ restrooms and locker rooms because of his sex.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing (1) MHRA does not cover gender identity claims and (2) a school district/board are not “persons” subject to suit under the MHRA.
- The circuit court dismissed R.M.A.’s petition with prejudice; R.M.A. appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard (accept pleaded facts as true, construe broadly) and identified the statutory elements of a § 213.065 public-accommodation sex-discrimination claim.
- The Court vacated the dismissal and remanded, concluding the petition adequately alleged (1) protected class (sex), (2) denial of public-accommodation use, (3) sex was a contributing factor, and (4) damages; it also held school entities qualify as “persons.” A dissent argued the MHRA protects biological sex only and the petition alleges discrimination based on transgender status, so it failed to state a claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petition states a claim under § 213.065 for sex discrimination in a public accommodation | R.M.A. alleged legal sex = male; was denied access to boys’ restroom/locker room because of sex | Petition actually alleges discrimination because he is transgender/has female genitalia; MHRA covers biological sex only | Majority: Petition states a § 213.065 claim when facts are accepted as pleaded; vacate dismissal and remand |
| What elements must be pleaded for a § 213.065 public-accommodation claim | Alleged elements: (1) member of protected class (sex), (2) denied full and equal use of public accommodation, (3) sex was contributing/motivating factor, (4) damages | N/A (Defendants contested sufficiency) | Majority: These elements suffice at pleading stage and R.M.A. pleaded them |
| Whether “person” in MHRA includes a school district and school board | N/A | School District/Board: not listed in § 213.010(14), so not a “person” subject to § 213.065 liability | Majority: Definition of “person” is inclusive; statute construed in pari materia shows state subdivisions are encompassed; entities are “persons” subject to suit |
| Scope of “sex” in MHRA (majority v. dissent) | R.M.A.: alleged sex-based discrimination (pleading legal sex male is sufficient) | Defendants/dissent: “sex” means biological sex; MHRA does not extend to discrimination based on transgender status or gender identity | Majority: At pleading stage, allegation of discrimination "on grounds of sex" is adequate; dissent: MHRA protects biological sex only and petition fails if the claim is grounded in transgender status |
Key Cases Cited
- Ward v. W. Cty. Motor Co., Inc., 403 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. banc 2013) (de novo review of motion to dismiss)
- Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393 (Mo. banc 2012) (pleadings must be accepted as true and construed in favor of pleader on 12(b)(6))
- Midstate Oil Co., Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. banc 1984) (elements of MHRA sex-discrimination claim used as analogue)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (sex stereotyping can be evidence that sex was a factor in discrimination)
- Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (allegation of discrimination “because of his sex” survives 12(b)(6), even where sexual orientation or other traits also alleged)