R.L.U. v. J.P., 198 A.3d 304

In 2005 J.P. (defendant) pled guilty to endangering R.L.U. (plaintiff) when she was 11; he was sentenced with parole supervision for life, ordered no contact, and subject to Megan’s Law registration.
In March 2017 defendant approached plaintiff at her workplace twice, made threatening/harassing remarks, and stared at her through a store door; plaintiff reported the incidents and police advised seeking relief under SASPA.
Plaintiff obtained a temporary SASPA protective order (Mar. 27, 2017); after a two-day hearing the Family Part judge found plaintiff’s 2005 intercourse nonconsensual and entered a final SASPA protective order (Apr. 19, 2017).
Entry of the final SASPA order triggered parole revocation proceedings (recorded as a Special Report), though the appellate court did not resolve parole revocation specifics.
Defendant moved to dismiss arguing SASPA could not be applied to predicate conduct that predated its enactment (ex post facto concern); the Family Part judge denied the motion.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding SASPA does not permit retroactive use of pre-enactment sexual assaults as predicate acts for a SASPA order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether SASPA may be used to obtain a protective order based on sexual assault that occurred before SASPA’s effective date	SASPA protects sexual-assault victims and the 2005 assault was a predicate act supporting a SASPA order	SASPA cannot be applied retroactively; the predicate act must occur after SASPA’s enactment	Held: SASPA is prospective; a pre-enactment assault cannot serve as a SASPA predicate
Whether legislative intent supports retroactive application of SASPA	Implied that remedies should be available to victims regardless of timing	No express or implicit legislative intent for retroactivity; statute delayed effect 180 days	Held: No evidence of retroactive intent; presumption against retroactivity applies
Whether SASPA is curative such that it should operate retroactively	(Plaintiff did not argue curative effect)	SASPA is not curative — it expands remedies rather than correcting a prior statute	Held: SASPA is not curative; curative exception does not apply
Whether parties’ expectations support retroactive application	(Plaintiff’s application emphasized 2017 acts)	Defendant had no expectation of this collateral consequence from his 2005 plea	Held: Parties did not expect retroactivity; that factor weighs against retroactive application

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2010) (deference to Family Part factfindings on credibility)
M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328 (2010) (deference to trial court factual findings)
Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373 (2016) (questions of law reviewed de novo)
Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370 (2016) (presumption that statutes apply prospectively; retroactivity requires legislative intent)
Cruz v. Central Jersey Landscaping, 195 N.J. 33 (2008) (prospective application of new laws and fairness considerations)
Twiss v. State, 124 N.J. 461 (1991) (retroactivity may not be used to impair vested rights)
Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589 (2018) (factors showing legislative intent for retroactivity)
James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552 (2013) (standards for finding retroactive legislative intent)
D.C. v. F.R., 286 N.J. Super. 589 (App. Div. 1996) (PDVA amendment applied prospectively, not retroactively)
Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 (1981) (interpretive principle regarding retroactivity and sensible statutory construction)
Nelson v. Bd. of Educ., 148 N.J. 358 (1997) (definition of curative statutes)
O'Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 132 N.J. 234 (1993) (court may resolve statutory issues without reaching constitutional claims)