R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Lyantie Townsend, as Personal etc.
160 So. 3d 570
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- In April 2010 the trial court entered a final judgment for Townsend awarding $46,308,000 total; the judgment specified post-judgment interest at 6% per annum from April 29, 2010.
- In 2012 the judgment was amended to a reduced total of $25,508,000, with the amended judgment stating the award would “bear interest as provided by law from April 29, 2010.”
- R.J. Reynolds moved to have the court determine the applicable post-judgment interest rate for interest accruing after July 1, 2011 (the effective date of a 2011 amendment to Fla. Stat. §55.03).
- The 2011 amendment changed §55.03 from a fixed post-judgment rate rule to a rate adjustable annually/quarterly by the Chief Financial Officer.
- The trial court denied Reynolds’ motion, finding the 2010 (fixed-rate) statute in effect at judgment governed until satisfaction; the appellate court reversed, holding the 2011 amendment applies to interest accruing after July 1, 2011.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Townsend) | Defendant's Argument (R.J. Reynolds) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2011 amendment to §55.03 applies to interest accruing after its effective date on judgments entered before July 1, 2011 | §55.03(3) (1998/2010) states the rate "established at the time a judgment is obtained shall remain the same until the judgment is paid," so the fixed rate at entry continues until satisfaction | The 2011 amendment contains no express limitation to future judgments and therefore applies prospectively to post-judgment interest accruing after July 1, 2011 | The 2011 amendment applies to interest accruing after July 1, 2011; reversible error to apply the earlier fixed rate beyond that date |
| Whether the 1998/2010 statutory language created a vested right in the fixed interest rate preventing later amendments from changing the rate | Townsend: the statute creates a permanent, vested right to the rate fixed at judgment | Reynolds: vested right exists only for interest accrued through the amendment’s effective date; legislature may change future interest rates | Court: judgment creditor has a vested right only to interest accrued before the amendment; after July 1, 2011 the legislature could change the rate |
| Whether §55.03(3) should be read to abrogate the common-law/default rule that legislative changes alter post-judgment interest on unsatisfied judgments | Townsend: §55.03(3) shows intent to keep rate fixed and thus to displace the common-law default | Reynolds: §55.03(3) does not clearly express an intent to bind future legislatures or to preclude future statutory changes | Court: §55.03(3) does not clearly show intent to abandon the common-law default rule; absent express language, new statute governs post-effective-date accrual |
| Whether the statutory change would impermissibly impair vested rights in violation of principles against retroactivity | Townsend: applying the amendment retroactively would reduce the value of an existing judgment | Reynolds: no constitutional impairment because only future interest (after amendment) is affected; vested interest limited to pre-amendment accrual | Court: No unconstitutional retroactive impairment — only pre-amendment interest is protected; post-amendment interest governed by new statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Motley v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162 (1892) (federal rule that judgment creditor has vested right to interest accrued before statutory change, but future interest subject to later legislation)
- Glades Cnty. v. Kurtz, 101 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1939) (amendment to post-judgment interest statute applies to interest accruing after amendment)
- Applestein v. Simons, 586 So.2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (statutory language can limit an amendment’s application to judgments entered on or after effective date)
- Beverly Enters. v. Spilman, 689 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (1994 amendment did not apply to judgments entered before its effective date where statute’s language limited applicability)
- Maronda Homes, Inc. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 127 So.3d 1258 (Fla. 2013) (retroactive application of legislation requires clear legislative intent and the law must be procedural or remedial)