67 So. 3d 1084
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2011Background
- The Engle progeny case against RJR resulted in a $15.75 million judgment against RJR.
- Florida law 569.23(3) was enacted to stay judgments pending appeal for FSA signatories with a capped bond.
- RJR posted a $5 million bond under §569.23(3) to obtain an automatic stay, instead of the larger bond under Rule 9.310(b)(1).
- Appellee challenged the bond on constitutional grounds, arguing §569.23(3) is unconstitutional.
- The trial court denied the challenge after considering legislative history and statutory structure.
- The First District Court of Appeal reviewed the bond sufficiency and constitutionality, and affirmed, also certifying a public-importance question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is §569.23(3) constitutional as a general law? | Hall argues it is a special law granting privilege to FSA signatories. | RJR contends it is a general law addressing statewide interests. | Constitutional; §569.23(3) is a general law. |
| Does §569.23(3) violate separation of powers by intruding on Supreme Court rulemaking? | Hall claims it usurps the Court's rulemaking authority. | RJR contends it sets a substantive bond limit permissible under general law. | No separation-of-powers violation. |
| Does §569.23(3) unnecessarily limit access to appellate stays? | Hall maintains the bond cap inadequately secures stays in large judgments. | RJR asserts the cap protects the state's revenue stream and public interests. | Bond cap is consistent with statutory design to balance interests. |
| Does the statute impermissibly apply to Engle progeny or decertified class actions beyond Engle? | Hall views narrow scope as overbroad or improperly targeted. | RJR notes statewide implications justify the scope and potential future cases. | Statute deemed to have general applicability within its purpose. |
| Is the automatic-stay mechanism under §569.23(3) enforceable and properly limited? | Hall questions enforceability if bond is insufficient. | RJR points to statutory framework and tiered security limits. | Statutory framework upheld; stay mechanism properly limited. |
Key Cases Cited
- Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Engle progeny context for stay and bonding issues)
- BDO Seidman, LLP v. Banco Espirito Santo International, Ltd., 998 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (upholding statutory bond caps; stay-related authority)
- St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961 (Fla. 2000) (rulemaking authority and general-law exceptions)
- Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1979) (rules vs. statutes controlling stays; procedural versus substantive)
- Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Dept. of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1983) (special vs general law; statewide interest considerations)
- Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2003) (general-law analysis despite narrow application)
- Department of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 912 So.2d 616 (Fla. 2005) (general-law classification related to public interest)
- Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Begley, 776 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (commentary on general-law exceptions to rulemaking)