R.G. v. R.M.
2017 Ohio 8918
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Petitioner R.G. obtained an ex parte civil stalking protection order after alleging repeated unwanted contact by former boyfriend R.M., who had previously been subject to a one-year no-contact consent entry.
- R.G. pro se presented evidence at the full hearing: >60 emails (obsessive/longing content), mailed cards, gifts left at her home, and bank correspondence indicating ongoing contact.
- R.G. testified she felt alarmed, did not feel safe, altered routines (scanning parking lots, changed habits), and consulted her family physician about the conduct; she was not under psychiatric care or taking psychotropic medication.
- The magistrate issued a five-year civil stalking protection order under R.C. 2903.211; the trial court signed it. R.M. objected, arguing insufficient proof of either (1) that R.M. caused R.G. to believe he would cause physical harm, or (2) that R.M. caused R.G. mental distress as statutorily defined.
- The trial court overruled objections, finding sufficient competent evidence that R.M. knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused R.G. mental distress. R.M. appealed, arguing both sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved R.M. caused R.G. to believe he would cause physical harm | N/A at trial on this ground; plaintiff did not press physical-harm theory | R.M.: No direct threats; emails expressly deny harming her, so no basis to find she believed he would cause physical harm | Court did not rely on physical-harm theory and made no finding for it; appeal focused on mental-distress ground |
| Whether R.M.'s conduct caused "mental distress" under R.C. 2903.211(D)(2) | R.G.: Obsessive contacts after a no-contact order changed her life, created fear/hypervigilance, and she consulted her family doctor — satisfying statutory mental-distress definitions | R.M.: R.G. had not sought mental-health treatment or medication; effects amount to annoyance or stress, not the statutory showing of mental illness or temporary substantial incapacity | Held: Preponderance of evidence supports that R.G. suffered mental distress (substantial life changes, hypervigilance, altered routines); sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges fail |
| Standard of review for civil protection order factual findings | R.G.: facts, credibility, and changed routines support order | R.M.: challenged both sufficiency and weight of evidence | Court applied sufficiency and manifest-weight analyses (Eastley/Thompkins); affirmed trial court's credibility determination |
| Interpretation of statutory phrase re: mental distress (whether "to believe" modifier applies) | R.G.: (implicit) mental distress must actually be caused | R.M.: argued strict statutory reading; cited district precedent requiring actual mental distress | Court follows 7th District precedent: "to believe" modifies only physical-harm clause; mental distress must actually be caused |
Key Cases Cited
- Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 (2012) (clarifies distinction between weight and sufficiency standards of review)
- Thompkins v. Ohio, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (establishes standard for manifest-weight review)
- Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34 (1997) (preponderance standard applies to civil domestic protection orders)
- Myers v. Garson, 66 Ohio St.3d 610 (1993) (trial court best positioned to assess witness credibility)
- Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1984) (appellate courts must make every reasonable presumption in favor of trial court’s judgment)