R.B. Sklaroff, M.D. v. Abington SD
2134 C.D. 2016
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Oct 16, 2017Background
- Appellant Robert B. Sklaroff, pro se, sued Abington School District and board members after being stopped from speaking at a May 2016 board meeting; he alleged he was entitled to 20 minutes on two topics under the Sunshine Act public-participation provision.
- He pleaded that he was told he had three minutes but actually spoke about six minutes before being interrupted; no other members sought to speak on those issues at that meeting.
- Complaint relied on the Board’s meeting policy (which generally limits individual citizen comments to three minutes and allocates about 20 minutes for matters regarding school affairs) and sought fines under the Sunshine Act.
- Abington filed preliminary objections arguing the Sunshine Act does not guarantee any specific speaker a fixed amount of time and that the topics were not on the agenda or certain to come before the board soon.
- Trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint; the Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding the complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to show a violation of the Act’s requirement of a "reasonable opportunity" to comment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sunshine Act requires a specific time allotment for an individual speaker | Sklaroff argued Board policy and practice entitled him to 20 minutes on school-affairs topics and that denying that time violated the Act | Abington argued the Act requires only a "reasonable opportunity" to comment, not a guaranteed specific time per speaker | Court: No specific time guarantee; limiting comments is lawful so long as a reasonable opportunity to comment is afforded |
| Whether violation of Board’s internal meeting rules equals a statutory Sunshine Act violation | Sklaroff contended breach of local agenda rules triggers statutory remedies under the Act | Abington argued violation of internal rules alone does not establish a statutory violation | Court: Violation of board policy does not, by itself, state a claim under the Act |
| Whether topics Sklaroff sought to address were "matters . . . which are or may be before the board" under Section 710.1(a) | Sklaroff averred his topics were matters of concern and anticipated to be before the board | Abington noted plaintiff did not plead that the issues were on the agenda or likely to come before the board imminently | Court: Plaintiff’s assertion is a legal conclusion; facts pled do not establish the topics were matters then before or likely to be before the board |
| Whether the complaint met Pennsylvania pleading standards to seek statutory fines under the Act | Sklaroff maintained his detailed factual allegations were sufficient to obtain relief | Abington argued the complaint failed to plead legally sufficient facts to obtain fines | Court: Complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Baravordeh v. Borough Council of Prospect Park, 706 A.2d 362 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (denial of right to speak may give rise to a Sunshine Act claim, but reasonable time limits are permissible)
- Alekseev v. City Council of the City of Phila., 976 A.2d 1253 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (subject-matter limitations on public comments are reasonable and do not violate the Sunshine Act)
- Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 961 A.2d 96 (Pa. 2008) (standard for reviewing preliminary objections/demurrers)
- Mier v. Stewart, 683 A.2d 930 (Pa. Super. 1996) (order sustaining preliminary objections without prejudice generally is not final for appeal purposes)