Quispe Del Pino v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 112 A.3d 522

Background

In 2000 appellant committed sexual offenses in Pennsylvania; in 2001 he pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years probation (effective termination April 9, 2011). His probation was transferred to Maryland and, as a Maryland resident convicted of out-of-state sexual offenses involving a minor, he was required to register under Maryland law for ten years.
The Maryland General Assembly’s 2010 amendment to the Maryland Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (MSORA) retroactively applied to persons required to register on September 30, 2010, and established a tiered system: Tier I (15 years), Tier II (25 years), Tier III (life).
By operation of the 2010 amendment appellant was reclassified as a Tier II offender and his required registration term increased from 10 to 25 years.
Appellant filed a petition for writ of prohibition arguing the retroactive extension violated the ex post facto prohibition of Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (and the U.S. Constitution). The circuit court denied relief and granted summary judgment for the Department.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding the 2010 amendment’s retroactive extension of appellant’s registration period from 10 to 25 years imposed additional punishment in violation of Article 17 and ordering relief; it also rejected the Department’s argument that federal SORNA compelled registration in Maryland in light of Doe II.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether retroactive application of 2010 MSORA amendment (which reclassified appellant as Tier II and extended registration from 10 to 25 years) violates ex post facto clause of Article 17	Quispe del Pino: retroactive extension disadvantages him and imposes additional punishment, violating Article 17	Department: MSORA is remedial/nonpunitive; merely updates contact information and public safety, so no ex post facto violation	Reversed — court held retroactive extension from 10 to 25 years violates Article 17 (following Doe I principles)
Whether the fact appellant was already on the registry when the amendment took effect distinguishes this case from Doe I	Appellant: being on registry does not justify retroactive extension; he would have been free of obligations after 10 years absent the amendment	Department: unlike Doe, MSORA existed when appellant committed the offense and he was on the registry when amendment took effect, so different result should follow	Held not distinguishing — court found the same substantive disadvantage (additional registration term) and applied Doe I reasoning to invalidate retroactive extension
Whether federal SORNA independently requires appellant to register in Maryland despite state invalidation	Appellant: issue not preserved; even on merits, SORNA would not keep him registering beyond his period given his record	Department: SORNA imposes individual federal obligation to register, so state invalidation irrelevant	Court followed Doe II: SORNA does not require registration in Maryland where retroactive state requirement is unconstitutional; appellant not required to register in Maryland beyond the original term
Remedy: whether circuit court’s denial and summary judgment for Department should be affirmed	Appellant: seeks prohibition and removal of extended registration obligation	Department: sought dismissal and enforcement of state registration	Court reversed circuit court and remanded with directions to enter order consistent with opinion (relief for appellant)

Key Cases Cited

Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535 (Md. 2013) (plurality: retroactive application of MSORA amendments violated Article 17 by disadvantaging registrant)
Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201 (Md. 2014) (courts may order removal of registry information where inclusion is unconstitutional under Doe I; SORNA does not compel state registration in those circumstances)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (articulates intent-effects test for determining whether registration statutes are punitive)
Young v. State, 370 Md. 686 (Md. 2002) (upheld pre-amendment Maryland registry as civil/remedial)
Ochoa v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 315 (Md. 2013) (statutory interpretation of retroactive application of MSORA; did not address Article 17 constitutional challenge)
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997) (discusses civil commitment and the civil/punitive distinction)