Quinton Thomas Quarles v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2016 SC 000684

Quinton Quarles and Keith Ivory were at a Hopkinsville house party; Quarles retrieved a long-barreled revolver and fired at Ivory during multiple confrontations, resulting in Ivory's death; Ivory was unarmed.
Quarles was Mirandized at the police station, signed a waiver, and underwent custodial interrogation from about 10:00 a.m. to 2:07 p.m.; he initially spoke with police without an attorney and later refused a polygraph or GSR test without an attorney present.
Police obtained a valid warrant to perform a gunshot residue (GSR) test after Quarles declined the GSR; during later questioning about his cell phone, Quarles admitted ownership of the phone and provided a password.
Electronic data from the cell phone showed a Google search about removing gunshot residue around 2:07 a.m. on the day of the shooting; the data were used at trial.
Quarles was convicted of murder by a Christian Circuit Court jury and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment; he appealed the suppression ruling and related evidentiary and instructional issues.
The appellate court held that the invocation of counsel before the GSR test was unequivocal and that the police violated Miranda, but the error was harmless given overwhelming evidence of guilt and absence of defense testimony.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the invocation of counsel unequivocal and did it require cessation of questioning?	Quarles clearly invoked counsel prior to the GSR test.	Invocation was equivocal and did not mandate stopping all questioning.	Invocation clear; questioning should have ceased until counsel appeared.
Were the statements obtained after invocation admissible as harmless error?	Any error was harmless given overwhelming evidence and lack of defense testimony.	Illegally obtained statements should be suppressed and not used to convict.	Harmless error; admission of statements was not reversible.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not instructing on lesser offenses including first-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide?	Evidence could support lesser-included offenses under EED or other theory.	No evidence warranted lesser-included instructions.	No abuse of discretion; no basis for those instructions.
Was there evidence of extreme emotional disturbance supporting manslaughter in the first degree?	EED could reduce liability to manslaughter in the first degree.	Evidence showed deliberate, premeditated murder, not EED.	Evidence did not establish EED; instruction not required.

Brown v. Commonwealth, 416 S.W.3d 302 (Ky. 2013) (two-step suppression review; de novo standard for law)
Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19 (Ky. 2011) (reinitiation rule for invoking counsel)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (defining unequivocal request for counsel and waiver criteria)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (police interrogation after invocation must cease)
Bradley v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 512 (Ky. 2010) (police cannot continue to cajole after invocation)
Bartley v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2014) (exclusionary rule and harmless-error standard applied to post-invocation statements)
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 287 (Ky. 2006) (harmful error standard and context in applying exclusionary rule)
Hasch v. Commonwealth, 421 S.W.3d 349 (Ky. 2013) (requirements for lesser-included offense instructions and evidence review)
Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2010) (EED standard for homicide instructions)
Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1998) (reckless homicide standards and self-defense considerations)