Quinteros v. Dyncorp
Civil Action No. 2007-1042
| D.D.C. | Nov 2, 2016Background
- Over 2,000 Ecuadorian residents allege DynCorp (U.S. contractor executing aerial herbicide spray under Plan Colombia) sprayed glyphosate onto their persons and property across the Ecuador–Colombia border; two consolidated actions proceeded with 20 party‑selected test plaintiffs.
- D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims requiring expert proof of general causation (physical injury/property damage) but remanded three common‑law claims that do not require such expert proof: battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and nuisance. Arias v. DynCorp, 752 F.3d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
- Defendants moved for summary judgment on the three remaining claims for the 20 test plaintiffs and sought to bind the remaining ~1,998 non‑test plaintiffs to those rulings.
- The district court limited adjudication to the nineteen surviving test plaintiffs (one died and his claim was dismissed for failure to substitute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25). The court held the test‑plaintiff process was a bellwether mechanism, not a consent to bind all non‑test plaintiffs on individualized issues.
- Defendants belatedly attempted to add a statute‑of‑limitations affirmative defense years after pleading; the court denied leave to amend due to undue delay and prejudice, so timeliness defense was forfeited as to the test plaintiffs.
- On the merits the court: (1) granted summary judgment on battery for 11 test plaintiffs who provided no evidence of bodily contact but denied it for 9 who testified to contact; (2) denied summary judgment on IIED for 5 test plaintiffs who showed severe emotional distress (with physical manifestations) and granted it for the other 15; and (3) granted summary judgment on nuisance for all test plaintiffs because alleged sprayings were sporadic and not sufficiently continuous or permanent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether rulings for test plaintiffs bind non‑test plaintiffs | Test process intended as bellwether; non‑test plaintiffs were not consenting to be bound | Test selection and discovery scope implies consent to be bound on legal/timeliness/specific causation issues | Court: Test group is bellwether only; no evidence of consent to bind non‑test plaintiffs; due‑process concerns weigh against wholesale binding |
| Whether defendants may assert statute‑of‑limitations defense | Plaintiffs: Defendants forfeited the defense by failing to plead it in answers; amendment now is unduly delayed and prejudicial | Defendants: Delay excusable because specific injury dates came out in depositions; may raise in dispositive motion and seek leave to amend | Court: Denied leave to amend for undue delay and prejudice; statute‑of‑limitations defense forfeited as to test plaintiffs |
| Battery: whether evidence supports intent and bodily offensive contact | Plaintiffs: Evidence shows pilots sprayed over/near homes, some plaintiffs testified spray contacted skin; conduct was substantially certain to cause contact and was offensive | Defendants: Any contact was from accidental "drift," not deliberate targeting; many plaintiffs lack proof of bodily contact | Court: For 9 test plaintiffs who testified to bodily contact, factual disputes on intent/offensiveness preclude summary judgment; for 11 without evidence of contact, battery dismissed |
| IIED: whether plaintiffs showed recklessness, outrageousness, and severe distress | Plaintiffs: DynCorp repeatedly ignored warnings and policy, recklessly continued spraying; some plaintiffs have physical manifestations of severe distress | Defendants: Conduct not sufficiently outrageous; emotional harms are not severe or lack physical manifestation | Court: Recklessness and outrageousness triable; 5 plaintiffs demonstrated severe distress (with physical manifestations) so IIED survives for them; IIED dismissed for the other 15 |
| Nuisance: whether sporadic sprayings constitute nuisance | Plaintiffs: Sprayings interfered unreasonably with use/enjoyment of land and persons | Defendants: Incidents were isolated/sporadic, not continuous or permanent as required for nuisance | Court: Nuisance requires continuity/permanence; test plaintiffs alleged sporadic incidents only—nuisance dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Arias v. DynCorp, 752 F.3d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (appellate decision narrowing claims to battery, IIED, nuisance and distinguishing need for expert proof on general causation)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment and "mere scintilla" standard)
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (U.S. 2006) (forfeiture of defenses not timely pleaded)
- Harris v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Rule 8(c) requires pleading affirmative defenses before raising them in dispositive motions)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (U.S. 1962) (standards for leave to amend pleadings)
- Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 808 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (undue delay in seeking to amend pleadings can warrant denial)
- Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (denial to amend for undue delay)
- Doe v. McMillan, 566 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (precedent affirming denial to amend after substantial delay)
- Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 64 A.3d 158 (D.C. 2013) (nuisance requires continuity/permanence)