Quinn v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
2014 SD 14
| S.D. | 2014Background
- Tenant Jonathan Quinn and family lived in a Barker & Little apartment; their toddler H.Q. developed severe lead poisoning from peeling/flaking paint in the unit.
- Quinn sued Barker & Little for negligence; Barker & Little tendered defense to its insurers, Farmers Insurance Exchange and Truck Insurance Exchange, which declined coverage citing a Lead Poisoning and Contamination exclusion (and umbrella exclusions).
- Barker & Little obtained a confessed judgment in the underlying suit for roughly $4 million; Farmers/Truck did not defend or intervene.
- Quinn (as judgment creditor/guardian) sued Farmers/Truck seeking declaratory relief and execution on the insurance policies under SDCL 58-23-1.
- At summary judgment the circuit court relied on a final version of the General Commercial Liability Policy containing the lead-exclusion language and granted insurers’ motion, holding no duty to defend or indemnify.
- The Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine factual dispute about which version of the policy (several different documents were submitted) reflected the parties’ actual agreement, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Quinn's Argument | Farmers/Truck's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether insurers were entitled to summary judgment that lead-poisoning claims were excluded and no duty to defend/indemnify existed | The policy evidence was inconsistent; genuine dispute exists about which policy language governed, so summary judgment was improper | The January 30 policy (with lead exclusion) accurately reflects parties’ intent and defeats coverage; summary judgment appropriate | Reversed: factual dispute over which policy was operative precluded summary judgment |
| Whether the court could resolve alleged contract language conflict as a matter of law on summary judgment | Quinn argued court must view all versions in favor of nonmovant and cannot resolve conflicting contract evidence on summary judgment | Farmers argued Quinn should have moved to strike or produced counter-evidence below and thus waived objection | Court held nonmovant need not have moved to strike; conflicts must be viewed in light most favorable to nonmovant and are factual issues for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 807 N.W.2d 612 (S.D. 2011) (summary judgment standard)
- Cole v. Wellmark of S.D., Inc., 776 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 2009) (coverage determined by contractual intent)
- Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 623 N.W.2d 84 (S.D. 2001) (meeting of the minds determined from words and conduct)
- Prunty Constr., Inc. v. City of Canistota, 682 N.W.2d 749 (S.D. 2004) (interpretation relies on contract language actually used)