219 So. 3d 1173
La. Ct. App.2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Charles Brian Sugar, Mackey Sugar Quinlan, Mickey McGuinness Quinlan) are family members; defendant Melissa Sugar Gold is an adopted daughter of the family patriarch, Alan Sugar.
- Defendant authored and published an online blog article titled “Elder Abuse and Betrayal of Trust” accusing plaintiffs of betraying their elderly father/trusting him and implying they coerced/control his company; defendant denied authoring two other allegedly defamatory websites.
- Plaintiffs sued for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and sought injunctive relief and removal of online posts.
- Defendant filed a special motion to strike under La. C.C.P. art. 971 (anti-SLAPP), asserting the blog addressed the public-issue of elder abuse and was protected speech; she sought attorney fees and costs.
- Trial court granted the special motion to strike, dismissed plaintiffs’ petition with prejudice, denied attorney fees; both sides appealed.
- The appellate court affirmed dismissal on merits (speech/public-issue, no probability of success on defamation or IIED) but reversed denial of attorney fees, remanding to award defendant reasonable fees and costs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of La. C.C.P. art. 971 (public-issue / anti-SLAPP) | Blog targeted plaintiffs personally; not a matter of public interest | Article discussed elder abuse (defined, solicited comment) and was published in a public forum — a public-issue exercise of free speech | Art. 971 applies; defendant met prima facie burden because article related to public-issue (elder abuse) |
| Defamation: whether plaintiffs showed probability of success | Statements named plaintiffs and accused them of preying on/defrauding their father; speech was false and defamatory per se | Defendant’s statements were opinion; she believed them true and submitted the father’s affidavit supporting her view | Plaintiffs failed to show probability of success: many statements were non-actionable opinion; for statements capable of defamatory meaning, plaintiffs produced no evidence of falsity or malice |
| IIED: whether plaintiffs showed probability of success | Blog intentionally sought to humiliate and cause severe emotional distress | Posts were insulting but rhetorical and opinion-based, not extreme/outrageous conduct | Plaintiffs failed to show extreme/outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress; IIED claim lacked probability of success |
| Attorney fees under Art. 971(B) | (Implicit) court may exercise discretion to deny fees despite prevailing motion | Art. 971(B) mandates that a prevailing party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs | Appellate court held prevailing defendant is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs; trial court erred in denying fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1971) (content, form, and context determine whether speech addresses a public concern)
- Costello v. Hardy, 864 So.2d 129 (La. 2003) (elements and analysis of defamation; distinction between opinion and provably false statements)
- Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552 (La. 1997) (defamation requires falsity and fault; actionable words and damages)
- Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345 (La. 1993) (defamatory words and their legal treatment)
- White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205 (La. 1991) (standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Jones v. Delta Fuel Co., Inc., 141 So.3d 352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2014) (procedure and burdens under La. C.C.P. art. 971 special motion to strike)