Quickway Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 117 F.4th 789

Background

Quickway operated a Louisville terminal under a Kroger Distribution Center (KDC) contract that produced ~96% of the terminal's revenue; Local 89 organized Louisville drivers and won a representation election in mid‑2020.
During organizing, Quickway managers made anti‑union statements, surveilled employee union activity, and engaged outside consultants; several unfair‑labor‑practice charges and pre‑election settlements existed.
On December 9, 2020, after media inquiries about a possible strike and fearing catastrophic liability, Quickway resigned the Kroger contract, removed equipment, ceased Louisville operations, and laid off all Louisville drivers effective that night.
Quickway offered to bargain over the effects the morning after the closure; the Union declined to discuss effects pending CBA negotiations. Quickway also sent non‑terminated drivers to remove equipment, who encountered the picket/closure.
The NLRB found Quickway violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) by (a) partially ceasing operations out of anti‑union animus and with intent/foreseeability to chill unionization elsewhere; (b) failing to bargain over the decision and its effects; and (c) threatening/interrogating employees.
The Board ordered restoration of Louisville operations (with a good‑faith/ tiered reinstatement scheme), reinstatement/backpay and make‑whole relief; the Sixth Circuit denied Quickway's petition and enforced the Board order in full.

Issues

Issue	Quickway's Argument	NLRB's Argument	Held
Did Quickway's partial cessation of Louisville operations violate § 8(a)(3) and (1) (Darlington test)?	Closure was an economic, entrepreneurial decision taken to avoid ruinous liability from a potential strike, not anti‑union motivated.	Closure was discriminatorily motivated by anti‑union animus, intended to chill unionization at other terminals, and chill was reasonably foreseeable.	Court upheld Board: substantial evidence supports finding of anti‑union animus, purpose to chill, and foreseeability — violation of § 8(a)(3) and (1).
Did Quickway violate § 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain over the closure decision and its effects?	First National Maintenance permits entrepreneurial partial closures without a bargaining obligation; Quickway offered to bargain over effects contemporaneously.	First National does not shield closures motivated by anti‑union animus; because Quickway refused to bargain over the closure decision, its offers to bargain only effects were insufficient.	Court upheld Board: because closure was discriminatorily motivated, First National exception did not apply; Quickway breached the duty to bargain over decision and effects.
Did Quickway commit unlawful threats/interrogations (§ 8(a)(1) and (4)) and were pre‑existing settlement agreements correctly set aside?	Some conduct was covered by prior settlement agreements; others (e.g., McCurry interrogation) lacked evidence of coercion.	Many incidents violated § 8(a)(1)/(4); post‑settlement unfair practices justified setting aside earlier agreements.	Court enforced Board findings: settlement was properly set aside given post‑settlement violations; McCurry’s interrogation had a coercive tendency and violated § 8(a)(1); other threats/retaliation violations upheld.
Are the Board's restoration and make‑whole remedies unduly burdensome or beyond its statutory authority; may Quickway raise new remedy objections on appeal?	Restoration and broad make‑whole remedies are punitive/unduly burdensome and should be vacated; Quickway may press make‑whole objections on appeal.	Restoration with a good‑faith, tiered reinstatement requirement is appropriate; Quickway failed to preserve objections to make‑whole relief before the Board (29 U.S.C. § 160(e)).	Court deferred to Board remedy: restoration/order not unduly burdensome nor an abuse of discretion; appellate review barred for issues not raised before the Board under § 10(e) — objection to make‑whole relief not considered.

Key Cases Cited

Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (establishes test for unlawful partial plant closures motivated to chill unionization)
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (partial closures for purely economic reasons are not mandatory subjects of bargaining; limited where anti‑union animus exists)
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (restoration orders aim to return parties to pre‑violation status quo)
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (deference to Board’s remedial expertise and traditional remedies such as bargaining orders/reinstatement)
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645 (1982) (Section 10(e) exhaustion bars courts from considering objections not urged before the Board)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (framework for distinguishing jurisdictional requirements from claim‑processing rules)
Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023) (clarifies when statutory exhaustion rules are nonjurisdictional claim‑processing requirements)
Purolator Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985) (supports inference of intent to chill where terminated and remaining employees are in close contact)
Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1969) (restoration orders appropriate to remedy discriminatorily motivated layoffs)
Mid‑South Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholds restoration order where equipment moved to affiliated facilities)