Quarry v. Doe I
137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 595
| Cal. | 2012Background
- Six Quarry brothers sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland for childhood sexual abuse by a priest in the 1970s.
- Plaintiffs discovered in 2006 that their adult psychological injuries were caused by the childhood abuse.
- Section 340.1 governs timeliness for childhood sexual abuse claims; history shows sequential amendments expanding and delimiting rights against direct perpetrators and third parties.
- 1998 amendment barred third-party claims after age 26, with a separate revival mechanism limited to certain circumstances in 2002.
- Court held claims lapsed by 1998 and were not revived beyond a one-year window in 2003, so action was barred.
- Court balanced the remedial aims of 340.1 with repose for defendants, concluding no revival beyond express provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effect of enlarged limitations pre/post amendment | Quarry brothers rely on 2002 revival to extend time. | Enlarged periods apply prospectively to pending claims; lapsed claims require express revival. | Enlarged periods do not revive unless expressly stated. |
| Lapsed claims against third parties pre-1998 | Discovery of adult injury could toll under prior rules. | 1998 age-26 cutoff barred third-party suits regardless of discovery. | Lapsed by 1998; revival limited by 2002 provisions. |
| Effect of 2002 amendment and subdivision (c) revival window | 2002 amendment revived lapsed claims and provided a one-year window. | Only those within the revival window could proceed; others remain barred. | Revival through (c) limited to one year; claims outside window barred. |
| Role of subdivision (u) revival language | Subdivision (u) indicates broader revival applicable to post-1999 filings. | Subdivision (u) retained for consistency but does not broadly revive undiscovered pre-1999 claims. | Subdivision (u) does not extend revival beyond explicit (c) language. |
Key Cases Cited
- Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston, 58 Cal.2d 462 (Cal. 1962) (retroactivity and revival of time-barred claims require express language)
- David A. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.4th 281 (Cal. Dist. 2 1993) (express revival language required to revive lapsed claims)
- Gallo v. Superior Court, 200 Cal.App.3d 1375 (Cal. Dist. 2 1988) (revival and retroactivity principles in limitations statutes)
- Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.4th 531 (Cal. 2007) (remedial nature of 340.1 and broad construction to aid victims)
- Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201 (Cal. 2007) (discovery rules and accrual under government claims context)
- Nelson v. Flintkote Co., 172 Cal.App.3d 727 (Cal. Dist. 2 1985) (retroactivity and standing in revival-like contexts; distinguishable from 340.1)
- Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay, 115 Cal.App.4th 1026 (Cal. Dist. 4 2004) (express revival provisions limit retroactive effects of enlargements)
- Moore v. State Bd. of Control, 112 Cal.App.4th 371 (Cal. Dist. 4 2003) (express revival clauses and expansion of remedies not implying broader revival)
- Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201 (Cal. 2007) (government claims accrual and discovery timing considerations)
- Lombardi, Inc. v. Smithfield, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. 1989) (example framework for balancing remedial statutes and repose)