707 S.E.2d 7
Va. Ct. App.2011Background
- Quarles and an eleven-year-old co-defendant were arrested for robbery and conspiracy on Oct. 21, 2008 and transported to the police station, where they were separated.
- Quarles was informed of Miranda rights; he signed a waiver but stated he wanted to speak to an attorney.
- Co-defendant confessed during a separate interview, after which Detective Alston joined Quarles’ room and stated, in part, that it was fine if Quarles did not want to talk.
- Quarles reiterated that he wished to speak; he signed a second waiver, stating he had asked for an attorney but had changed his mind.
- Quarles subsequently admitted planning to rob a white lady in the VCU area, handed a knife to the co-defendant, and struck the victim with a brick.
- Quarles moved to suppress the statements made after the second waiver; the trial court denied, but on en banc review the court reversed and remanded for suppression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Alston impermissibly reinitiate interrogation after counsel was invoked? | Quarles argues Edwards/Miranda prohibit further interrogation after invocation. | Commonwealth contends the remarks were not a reinitiation or interrogation. | Yes; reinitiation occurred and statements were inadmissible. |
| Are the subsequent waivers and statements voluntary after the invocation? | Quarles contends any waiver post-invocation is invalid if prompted by police. | Commonwealth argues waiver was voluntary despite initial invocation. | Waiver not voluntary; statements inadmissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. Supreme Court 1966) (fundamental right to counsel during custodial interrogation)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. Supreme Court 1981) (right to counsel after invoking; police cannot reinitiate without counsel present)
- Innis v. Rhode Island, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. Supreme Court 1980) (defines interrogation to include statements reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response)
- Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527 (Va. App. 1998) (Edwards three-part framework for admissibility after invocation)
- Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 324 (Va. App. en banc 2008) (relevant analysis on continued questioning after invocation)
- Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (U.S. Supreme Court 1988) (clarifies voluntariness of statements under coercive interrogation context)
