Quam v. Grove
1 CA-CV 14-0786
| Ariz. Ct. App. | Oct 25, 2016Background
- Robert and Theresa Grove divorced by consent decree that incorporated a marital settlement agreement dividing Robert’s ASRS pension benefits evenly, awarding the marital residence to Robert with a refinance requirement, and directing both to keep each other as life-insurance beneficiaries until refinance completion.
- Robert died two weeks after the dissolution. Theresa was initially appointed personal representative; Robert’s sister Kathy Quam petitioned to remove her, arguing Theresa’s nomination was revoked by operation of law after divorce and that nonprobate beneficiary designations were not revived by the decree.
- At hearing Theresa testified about settlement negotiations, claiming Robert misrepresented a life-insurance lapse; a legal document preparer partially corroborated her statements. Quam objected under Arizona’s deadman statute (A.R.S. § 12-2251).
- The superior court removed Theresa as personal representative but ruled Theresa remained the beneficiary of Robert’s life insurance and retained one-half of his pension because the consent decree (read as a whole) preserved those beneficiary arrangements.
- The court declined to rely on Theresa’s extrinsic testimony to interpret the consent decree and rejected her fraud claim about the settlement agreement; Quam appealed the beneficiary ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Quam) | Defendant's Argument (Theresa) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Theresa’s testimony about pre-death negotiations (A.R.S. § 12-2251) | Testimony about transactions with decedent was barred by deadman statute and should be excluded | Testimony admissible because corroborated and necessary to prevent injustice (fraud in agreement) | Court did not abuse discretion admitting testimony; any error harmless because court did not rely on extrinsic evidence to interpret decree and rejected fraud claim |
| Whether superior court had jurisdiction to determine rights to life-insurance proceeds and pension | Life-insurance proceeds are nonprobate and not part of estate; superior court lacks jurisdiction over nonprobate beneficiary disputes | Superior court is a unified court of general jurisdiction and may adjudicate probate matters and related civil claims | Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve claims connected to estate administration |
| Whether consent decree incorporated settlement agreement such that beneficiary designation survived divorce | (Raised in briefing but first asserted in reply) Decree did not incorporate settlement agreement; therefore court order did not preserve beneficiary designation | Decree expressly incorporated the settlement agreement dividing pension and maintaining beneficiary status until refinance | Court treated incorporation as established in record and held decree preserved Theresa’s beneficiary rights (argument denied on appeal as improperly raised) |
| Award of attorneys’ fees to Theresa | N/A (Quam challenged Theresa) | Theresa requested fees under A.R.S. § 14-3720 for defending actions as personal representative | Theresa awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees for superior court and appellate work related to brief preparation; entitled to appellate costs |
Key Cases Cited
- Bogard v. Cannon & Wendt Elec. Co., 221 Ariz. 325 (App. 2009) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings and prejudice requirement)
- Estate of Calligaro v. Owen, 159 Ariz. 498 (App. 1988) (deadman statute: transaction testimony admissible only to prevent injustice or with corroboration)
- In re Marriage of Zale, 193 Ariz. 246 (1999) (consent decree is an independent final judgment; parol evidence not used to alter decree)
- Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers, 184 Ariz. 98 (1995) (superior court is a single unified court of general jurisdiction; probate classification is administrative)
- Jones v. Sailes (In re Estate of Jones), 10 Ariz. App. 480 (1969) (life-insurance proceeds payable to nonprobate beneficiary do not become part of the estate)