Qiuyuan Huang v. NGOC BACH PHAN
21-2040
| 3rd Cir. | Jul 14, 2022Background
- Plaintiffs Qiuyuan Huang, Jing Lin, and their son Tiange Huang sued former landlords and a property manager, alleging failures to provide statutorily required lead-based paint disclosures in violation of the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (RLPHRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and prospective injunctive relief under TSCA and RLPHRA, plus $10 million in damages; defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Plaintiffs sought leave to file a second amended complaint that would add Pennsylvania emotional-distress claims; the proposed pleading attached the lease and reiterated alleged exposure to paint chips/dust and resulting distress.
- The District Court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice: it held TSCA relief unavailable because plaintiffs were no longer tenants, found RLPHRA claims inadequately pleaded as to damages (and dismissed two plaintiffs for lack of statutory standing), and denied leave to amend as futile.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. It agreed TSCA injunctive/declaratory relief was unavailable to former tenants, held the RLPHRA damages allegations were not plausibly pleaded, found the district court should have considered Cudjoe on non-lessee standing but concluded the non-lessee claims were nonetheless deficient, and affirmed denial of leave to amend as futile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability of injunctive/declaratory relief under TSCA for former tenants | Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to restrain alleged TSCA violations | TSCA private action permits injunctive relief but plaintiffs no longer occupy the property, so prospective relief is unavailable | TSCA claims and declaratory relief dismissed: former-tenant status bars requested relief |
| Whether RLPHRA supports plaintiffs' damages claims | Plaintiffs alleged exposure to lead hazards, emotional distress, and that they would not have leased but for nondisclosure | Defendants argued the complaint fails to plead "damages incurred" with factual plausibility | RLPHRA damages allegations are conclusory and implausible; RLPHRA claims dismissed |
| Standing of non‑lessee residents (Tiange and Lin) to sue under RLPHRA | Plaintiffs argued non‑lessee residents have Article III and prudential standing; lease supports their connection | Defendants argued statutory text limits recovery to purchaser or lessee (no standing for residents) | Third Circuit noted Cudjoe permits consideration of Article III/prudential standing but ultimately affirmed dismissal because the non‑lessee claims were also implausibly pleaded |
| Denial of leave to amend to add Pennsylvania emotional‑distress claims | Plaintiffs sought to add state-law emotional-distress claims based on alleged exposure and distress | Defendants argued amendment would be futile and district court should dismiss federal claims | Denial of leave to amend affirmed as amendment would be futile; court would not (or need not) exercise supplemental jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Cudjoe ex rel. Cudjoe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 426 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (non‑statutory plaintiffs may have standing if Article III and prudential elements met)
- Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990) (former occupancy can render injunctive relief unavailable)
- St. Thomas‑St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Gov’t of U.S. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2000) (limits on declaratory relief and its availability)
- Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2018) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275 (3d Cir. 2021) (pleading standard: factual matter must make claim plausible)
- James v. City of Wilkes‑Barre, 700 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2012) (courts may disregard conclusory legal recitals at pleading stage)
- Randall v. Laconia, NH, 679 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (observing a person damaged by RLPHRA violation may seek recovery)
- Bruffett v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (elements of Pennsylvania intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Toney v. Chester Cnty. Hosp., 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011) (distinguishing impact and non‑impact emotional‑distress claims under Pennsylvania law)
- Ellison v. Am. Bd. of Orthopaedic Surgery, 11 F.4th 200 (3d Cir. 2021) (documents appended to a motion to dismiss may be considered)
- Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2020) (appellate courts may affirm on any ground supported by the record)