Pyon v. State, 112 A.3d 1130

Background

On Dec. 14, 2013, Officer Sally Kimmett responded to a radio dispatch reporting "drug activity" near Overheart Lane; the anonymous tip referenced two black males in a Toyota Corolla and a gray Honda SUV.
Kimmett arrived at ~12:11 a.m.; she observed an unoccupied gray Honda SUV and a second parked Honda with driver James Chinham and passenger Andrew Pyon (appellant).
Kimmett parked her marked cruiser "cater-corner" to the second Honda in a way that partially impeded egress, approached quickly, and asked the driver for identification as he was exiting.
After seeing the passenger, Kimmett called for backup; when backup arrived she approached the passenger, requested his ID, and testified she smelled raw marijuana from the passenger compartment.
Officers conducted a warrantless Carroll search of the vehicle and recovered 3.37 grams of marijuana from the glove compartment; Pyon was convicted in a bench trial and fined $500.
On appeal the court reviewed whether the encounter before the officer smelled marijuana was a consensual accosting (no Fourth Amendment seizure) or a Terry investigative stop (triggering Fourth Amendment protections), and whether suppression of the seized marijuana was required.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Pyon)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the initial police approach constituted a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment	The officer's parking to partially block the car, peremptory request for ID, call for backup, presence of two uniformed officers, late-night location, and failure to tell occupants they were free to leave transformed the encounter into a nonconsensual Terry stop	The encounter was a consensual accosting; officers merely approached, asked questions, and the occupants voluntarily complied so Fourth Amendment does not apply	Court held the encounter was a seizure (not consensual); Fourth Amendment applied and was not satisfied prior to the odor detection, so evidence should've been suppressed
Whether the anonymous radio tip provided reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop	Tip was unverified, anonymous, inconsistent with what officers found (different vehicle type, different descriptions), so it did not supply reasonable suspicion	Tip and on-scene observations justified the officers' response	Court held the anonymous tip lacked indicia of reliability and did not provide Terry-level reasonable suspicion
Whether the odor of marijuana (as smelled by the officer) provided probable cause for a Carroll search	If the encounter were lawful up to the smell, a trained officer's detection of marijuana odor supplies probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search	State argued smell gave probable cause and made the search valid	Court noted smell would supply probable cause but held it was fruit of the unlawful seizure and thus tainted; suppression required
Whether evidence was legally sufficient to support possession conviction absent suppression	The recovered marijuana and its location in the glove compartment supported a reasonable inference of joint constructive possession	State argued sufficiency based on Pringle inference and admitted evidence	Court held the evidence was legally sufficient (but suppression issue controls remedy); suppression warranted, so conviction reversed

Key Cases Cited

Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139 (Md. 2006) (describes three tiers of police–citizen encounters and factors converting consensual encounter into a seizure)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes investigatory stop standard: reasonable, articulable suspicion)
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (U.S. 2007) (passengers are seized during a traffic stop and have standing to challenge the stop)
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (U.S. 2000) (anonymous tip lacking predictive information does not justify a stop)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (U.S. 1925) (automobile exception: probable cause permits warrantless vehicle search)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980) (consensual encounters distinguished from seizures by whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave)
Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 (Md. 1999) (factors to evaluate coerciveness of encounter: time/place, number of officers, if person told free to leave, removal of documents, threatening behavior)
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (U.S. 2003) (probable cause to infer joint possession among vehicle occupants)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (U.S. 1984) (traffic stops significantly limit freedom of action and constitute seizures)