Putnam v. Scherbring, 297 Neb. 868

In April 2012 Putnam sued the Scherbrings for injuries and medical expenses stemming from a December 2008 car collision; the Scherbrings conceded negligence but disputed causation and damages.
The district court entered progression/scheduling orders setting expert-disclosure and discovery deadlines; the court granted multiple continuances and reset trial dates after Putnam missed deadlines and counsel experienced health problems.
Putnam disclosed a supplemental expert report on March 30, 2015 (asserting traumatic brain injury and opining that multiple providers’ bills were fair, reasonable, and necessary) but did not disclose it to defendants until June 2, 2015—22 days before trial and long after discovery closed.
The Scherbrings moved in limine to exclude untimely-disclosed expert opinions and medical bills; the district court sustained the motion in part, allowing the expert to testify only about his own billed services and excluding the remainder for lack of foundation.
The jury returned a verdict for the Scherbrings. The Nebraska Court of Appeals (split) reversed, holding the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence without applying the Norquay discovery-sanction factors. The Nebraska Supreme Court granted further review.

Issue	Putnam's Argument	Scherbring's Argument	Held
Whether Norquay discovery‑sanction factors governed exclusion of untimely expert opinions	District court should have applied Norquay factors before excluding evidence	District court enforced its progression order via inherent power; Norquay (a Rule 37 sanction analysis) did not apply	Norquay factors did not apply; district court acted under inherent authority to enforce progression orders
Whether exclusion of the untimely expert opinion and related medical bills was an abuse of discretion	Exclusion was an abuse because the factors in Norquay were not considered	Exclusion was reasonable to prevent prejudice and further delay after multiple extensions	No abuse of discretion; exclusion upheld
Whether courts must tolerate late disclosures when continuances previously granted for counsel illness	Late disclosure was justified by counsel’s health issues and prior continuances	Repeated accommodations do not obligate further delay that undermines progression standards	Prior accommodations considered, but court reasonably declined further delay to enforce progression standards
Whether medical bills required expert foundation to be admissible	Putnam argued some providers could testify to bills without the new opinion	Scherbrings argued bills lacked necessary foundation because the critical expert opinion was excluded	Medical bills were inadmissible without the expert foundation; exclusion of bills affirmed

Norquay v. Union Pacific Railroad, 225 Neb. 527, 407 N.W.2d 146 (1987) (factors for precluding testimony as a Rule 37 discovery sanction)
State v. Chauncey, 295 Neb. 453, 890 N.W.2d 453 (2017) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard explained)
Roskop Dairy v. GEA Farm Tech., 292 Neb. 148, 871 N.W.2d 776 (2015) (discretion over discovery rulings)
Tyler v. Heywood, 258 Neb. 901, 607 N.W.2d 186 (2000) (appellate review of inherent power is for abuse of discretion)
In re Interest of Zachary D. & Alexander D., 289 Neb. 763, 857 N.W.2d 323 (2015) (recognition of courts’ inherent authority for administration of justice)
Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131, 816 N.W.2d 742 (2012) (medical expense recovery requires proof of reasonable value)