Purifoy v. State
2015 Ark. 353
| Ark. | 2015Background
- In 1996 Ivory Purifoy pleaded guilty to multiple felonies in Pulaski County and received an aggregate 720‑month sentence.
- In 2014 Purifoy filed a pro se petition in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that his plea agreement was breached and requesting a nunc pro tunc order, alleging parole‑eligibility was miscalculated.
- The circuit court denied the petition on December 3, 2014; Purifoy did not timely appeal and now seeks leave from the Arkansas Supreme Court for a belated appeal, claiming the circuit clerk failed to provide the order in time to perfect a 30‑day appeal.
- The Supreme Court emphasized that perfecting an appeal is the appellant’s responsibility, even for pro se litigants, and adherence to appellate rules is required.
- The Court concluded that (1) Purifoy’s clerk‑delay claim does not excuse his failure to timely appeal, (2) the circuit court lacked authority to grant parole‑eligibility relief because parole determinations are executive functions, and (3) any collateral attack on a guilty plea is untimely under Rule 37.2(c)(i) (and §16‑90‑111 does not save the petition absent a facially illegal judgment).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether clerk’s alleged failure to provide the order excuses missing the 30‑day appeal deadline | Purifoy: clerk did not furnish the order in time, so he should be allowed a belated appeal | State: appellant bears responsibility to perfect appeal; clerk error does not relieve procedural duty | Denied — appellant is responsible; pro se status does not excuse noncompliance |
| Whether the circuit court could grant relief as to parole‑eligibility calculations | Purifoy: court should correct parole‑eligibility calculation as breach of plea | State: parole eligibility is executive (ADC) prerogative, not subject to judicial correction | Denied — court lacked jurisdiction to alter parole‑eligibility determinations |
| Whether the petition constituted a timely Rule 37 postconviction petition | Purifoy: framed as relief from plea/breach; sought correction of sentence calculation | State: any collateral attack on guilty plea must meet Rule 37 timing (90 days from judgment) | Denied — petition filed ~18 years after judgment, untimely under Rule 37.2(c)(i) |
| Whether §16‑90‑111 permits relief despite Rule 37 time bar | Purifoy: alternative statutory vehicle for sentence correction | State: §16‑90‑111 claims are governed by Rule 37 timing unless judgment is facially illegal | Denied — Purifoy did not allege a facially illegal judgment; statute does not save untimely claim |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tejeda‑Acosta, 427 S.W.3d 673 (Ark. 2013) (time limitations in Rule 37.2(c) are jurisdictional and a trial court lacks jurisdiction if they are not met)
