Purdum v. Purdum, 301 P.3d 718

Purdum sued Harcsar for defamation over statements in her petition for Catholic marriage annulment to the Archdiocesan Tribunal, published only within the church process.
The trial court dismissed under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on an alleged First Amendment absolute privilege.
The Archdiocese submitted briefs as amicus arguing privilege, church autonomy, and lack of jurisdiction under church-related doctrines.
The appellate record centered on whether civil courts may adjudicate defamation arising from ecclesiastical proceedings without entangling canon law.
The majority ultimately held that Establishment Clause concerns preclude civil jurisdiction over the defamation claims, affirming dismissal; the factual record was deemed insufficient to resolve consent or other defamation defenses.
There was a separate concurrence and dissent addressing church autonomy, ministerial exception, and consent defenses, with different views on remand vs. dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Harcsar’s statements are absolutely privileged under the Free Exercise Clause.	Purdum argues no absolute privilege applies.	Harcsar (via Archdiocese) contends an absolute privilege exists.	Absolute privilege not recognized; not a basis to dismiss.
Whether church autonomy/undue entanglement justifies dismissal of the defamation claim.	Archdiocese argues autonomy/entanglement require dismissal.	These doctrines should bar secular review of church matters.	Not a basis to dismiss on the record; not controlling here.
Whether the civil court may exercise jurisdiction given the ecclesiastical context under the Establishment Clause.	Civil court can adjudicate neutral defamation claims regardless of church proceedings.	Civil review would entangle canon law and church process.	Establishment Clause precludes jurisdiction; action affirmatively dismissed.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (First Amendment applies to states via Fourteenth Amendment; free exercise and belief safeguards.)
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (Church autonomy; civil courts should not overturn ecclesiastical decisions on faith.)
Milivojevich (Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich), 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (Civil courts may not review ecclesiastical determinations on doctrine/polity.)
Bryce v. Episcopal Church in Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002) (Church autonomy/undue entanglement limits civil review in church disputes.)
Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Neutral generally applicable laws may regulate religious practices; free exercise not absolute.)
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (Neutral laws may regulate, not target, religious activities; no broad privileging.)
Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1 (1986) (Privilege is an affirmative defense, not jurisdictional bar.)
Sampson v. Rumsey, 1 Kan. App. 2d 191 (1977) (Articulates purpose of absolute privilege for public service functions.)
Milivojevich (additional reference), 426 U.S. 696 (1976) ((see above))