Puppies 'N Love v. Phoenix, City of
2:14-cv-00073
D. Ariz.Oct 18, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Puppies ‘N Love and owners) challenged Phoenix City Code § 8-3.06, which barred pet stores from selling dogs and cats unless from shelters or nonprofit rescues. Plaintiffs claimed constitutional violations and state preemption.
- The Humane Society of the United States intervened; the district court granted summary judgment for the City and HSUS, upholding the Ordinance.
- While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, Arizona enacted A.R.S. §§ 44-1799.10–.11, allowing sales from certain USDA-licensed breeders and expressly preempting local ordinances that impose stricter requirements.
- The Ninth Circuit remanded for consideration of the new statute’s effect. The parties submitted supplemental briefing and stipulated facts; no further oral argument was held.
- The district court found the state statute addresses a statewide concern and therefore preempts Phoenix’s Ordinance; it also vacated its prior judgment in favor of the City and HSUS. The action was terminated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.R.S. §§ 44-1799.10–.11 preempt Phoenix’s Ordinance | Plaintiffs: statute preempts Ordinance and thus moots the case | City/HSUS: subject is a purely local matter (animal homelessness sourcing) and statute does not preempt under Arizona home-rule principles | Held: statute governs a matter of statewide concern and preempts the Ordinance |
| Whether Phoenix, as a charter city, retained authority to regulate pet sources despite state law | Plaintiffs: state regulation of pet dealers is statewide; Legislature intended preemption | City/HSUS: home-rule autonomy permits local stricter regulation | Held: home-rule does not protect Ordinance because the subject matter is not a "purely municipal affair" |
| Whether plaintiffs’ lobbying to enact the statute bars vacatur of the district court’s prior judgment | City/HSUS: plaintiffs caused mootness by persuading the Legislature; equity disfavors vacatur | Plaintiffs: lobbying does not "cause" legislation for vacatur analysis under separation-of-powers precedent | Held: under Ninth Circuit precedent, legislative enactment is not treated as caused by private lobbying; plaintiffs did not cause mootness |
| Whether the court should vacate its prior summary-judgment decision | Plaintiffs: equitable relief (vacatur) is appropriate because mootness resulted from state statute | City/HSUS: public interest and plaintiffs’ actions weigh against vacatur | Held: court vacated its prior judgment; vacatur appropriate where plaintiffs did not cause the mootness by voluntary action |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663 (Ariz. 2017) (describes when state law preempts charter-city ordinances and frames the statewide vs. purely local inquiry)
- Jett v. City of Tucson, 882 P.2d 426 (Ariz. 1994) (charter cities may exercise powers granted by charter unless inconsistent with constitution or general state law)
- Chemical Producers & Distributors Ass’n v. Helliker, 463 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2006) (lobbying by private parties does not ‘cause’ legislative enactments for vacatur analysis)
- U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1994) (vacatur standards where mootness results from settlement; equitable considerations for vacatur)
- NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of State of Cal., 488 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2007) (district-court opinions remain citable even if vacated; limited practical effect of vacatur on persuasive authority)
- Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1902) (regulation of livestock as exercise of state police power)
- Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (U.S. 1897) (dogs and similar matters are subject to the police power of the state)