Pulsifer v. United States
601 U.S. 124
| SCOTUS | 2024Background
- Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing ≥50 grams of methamphetamine and faced a 15-year mandatory minimum unless he qualified for the federal "safety‑valve" at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
- § 3553(f)(1) (as amended by the First Step Act of 2018) requires the court to find the defendant “does not have—(A) more than 4 criminal history points . . . ; (B) a prior 3‑point offense . . . ; and (C) a prior 2‑point violent offense . . .” for safety‑valve eligibility.
- Pulsifer had two prior three‑point offenses (totaling six points); the Government argued any one of the three subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) disqualifies, while Pulsifer argued only having all three together (A+B+C) disqualifies.
- The district court and the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Government and denied safety‑valve relief; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over the provision’s construction.
- The question presented: does the phrase “the defendant does not have (A), (B), and (C)” mean the court must find the defendant lacks each separate item (no A, no B, no C), or that the defendant lacks the combined trio (not (A and B and C))?
- The Court examined grammar, the Sentencing Guidelines’ point mechanics, the canon against surplusage, the statute’s gatekeeping function, and the rule of lenity before reaching its holding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper construction of § 3553(f)(1)’s criminal‑history clause | "Does not have A, B, and C" means ineligibility only if the defendant has all three together (combination theory) | The clause sets an eligibility checklist: the defendant must not have A, and must not have B, and must not have C (separate requirements) | Court held clause requires satisfying each condition separately: defendant must not have more than 4 points, must not have a prior 3‑point offense, and must not have a prior 2‑point violent offense (checklist) |
| Whether Pulsifer’s reading would render subparagraph (A) superfluous | Pulsifer: no superfluity because Guidelines’ counting rules can make a prior 3‑point and a 2‑point offense contribute zero countable points (so A can still matter) | Government: B + C will always produce >4 points so A would be redundant under combination reading | Court held that under the Guidelines an offense that yields zero countable points cannot be a "2‑point" or "3‑point" offense for § 3553(f)(1); therefore the combination reading creates surplusage—A, B, and C each perform independent work under the Government's reading |
| Applicability of the rule of lenity | If ambiguous, interpret criminal statute in favor of defendants; adopt Pulsifer's (more lenient) reading | Lenity applies only if genuine ambiguity remains after contextual and textual analysis | Court held no genuine ambiguity remains after considering text, context, and Guidelines mechanics, so lenity does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Defense, 583 U.S. 109 (2018) (canon against surplusage has special force where a provision appears designed to serve a concrete function)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79 (2018) (context matters in determining whether conjunctive/disjunctive terms are meant to be read with their ordinary disjunctive meanings)
- Niz‑Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021) (statutory interpretation starts from how an ordinary reader would understand the text)
- Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (once most natural sense of statutory terms is identified, interpretive task is usually at an end)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (sentencing guidelines as a starting point for individualized sentencing)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts may vary from guideline ranges when appropriate)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (courts should not disregard customary meanings of conjunctions like “or” when interpreting statutes)
- Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011) (Congress may adopt standardized formulas that are over‑ and under‑inclusive; courts should not rewrite statutes for perceived anomalies)
- United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (rule of lenity applicable when a penal statute is genuinely ambiguous)