Pulaski County Special School District v. Lewis
2017 Ark. App. 264
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Two certified elementary teachers (Lewis — 2nd grade; Fitzgiven — 5th grade) sued Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD), alleging the district assigned them more than the statutory 60 minutes/week of "noninstructional duties" by requiring them to supervise a 15‑minute daily playground "physical‑activity" period.
- Arkansas law (Ark. Code Ann. § 6‑17‑117) caps teacher noninstructional duties at 60 minutes/week and defines ‘‘noninstructional duties’’ to include supervision during recess; another statute required 90 minutes/week of student physical activity, which could include recess.
- Before 2012–13 PCSSD used paid monitors to supervise recess; starting 2012–13 the district renamed the 15‑minute recess as a "physical‑activity" period and required certified teachers (on rotation) to supervise so the time would count toward the 90‑minute requirement.
- Teachers alleged the supervision was noninstructional recess time and that the added 15 minutes/day caused them to exceed the 60‑minute statutory cap, seeking monetary damages and an injunction.
- The trial court found the 15‑minute period was functionally recess (title change was semantic), was noninstructional supervision under § 6‑17‑117(b), awarded damages and enjoined PCSSD from assigning more than 60 minutes/week unless a separate contract was executed.
- PCSSD appealed, arguing the period was part of the instructional day (a "physical‑activity" instructional period) and thus not a noninstructional duty; the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 15‑minute daily period is a “noninstructional duty” under Ark. Code Ann. § 6‑17‑117(b) | The 15‑minute period is recess/noninstructional; teacher supervision counts toward the 60‑minute cap | PCSSD: renaming it a "physical‑activity" period made it part of the instructional day, not a noninstructional duty | Held: The period was recess in substance and thus a noninstructional duty under § 6‑17‑117(b); title change was semantic and court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. |
| Whether the activity could be characterized as ‘‘instructional purposes’’ under § 6‑17‑117(c) (i.e., related to teaching duties) | The activity was not related to teaching duties; students freely chose activities and no lesson plans were required | PCSSD/amicus: focus should be on whether activity was instructional, not whether labeled recess | Held: No evidence showed the period was related to teaching duties; even under § 6‑17‑117(c) it was noninstructional. |
| Whether the trial court erred by focusing on the recess definition instead of instructional‑purpose analysis | Counsel for teachers argued recess characterization was appropriate under § 6‑17‑117(b) | Amicus argued trial court should have decided whether the period was for instructional purposes | Held: Appellate court declined to consider an issue not ruled on below; trial court’s recess finding was permissible and supported. |
| Whether injunction and damages were proper remedies | Teachers sought injunctive relief to prevent future assignments exceeding 60 minutes and monetary damages for past excess | PCSSD contended schedule complied with law by treating period as instructional | Held: Trial court correctly found damages and injunction appropriate because teachers were deprived of instructional planning time and remedying with damages alone was inadequate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bohannon v. Robinson, 447 S.W.3d 585 (Ark. 2014) (bench‑trial factual findings reviewed for clear error)
- Brock v. Townsell, 309 S.W.3d 179 (Ark. 2009) (statutory interpretation de novo; avoid literal reading producing absurd results)
- Calaway v. Practice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., (2010) 2010 Ark. 432 (gives effect to ordinary meaning of statutory language)
- Brown v. State, 292 S.W.3d 288 (Ark. 2009) (no resort to interpretive rules when statute is clear and unambiguous)
- Helena‑W. Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 268 S.W.3d 879 (Ark. 2007) (legal conclusions reviewed de novo)
- Fordyce Bank & Trust Co. v. Bean Timberland, Inc., 251 S.W.3d 267 (Ark. 2007) (issues not raised below cannot be reviewed on appeal)