573 F.Supp.3d 921
S.D.N.Y.2021Background
- Plaintiffs are U.S. nationals (heirs of Banco Pujol) whose bank was confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960; Banco Pujol’s assets were absorbed into Banco Nacional de Cuba (BNC).
- Title III of the Helms-Burton Act (22 U.S.C. § 6082 et seq.) creates a private cause of action against persons who "traffic" in property confiscated by Cuba; Presidents had repeatedly suspended Title III until May 2019 when the suspension was lifted.
- Plaintiffs sued Société Générale and BNP Paribas in November 2020, alleging the banks trafficked in Banco Pujol’s confiscated assets by arranging credit facilities and dollar services for BNC (alleged primary activity dated roughly 2000–2010) and that the banks profited from those activities.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing lack of Article III standing and that plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred by 22 U.S.C. § 6084 (two-year limit after trafficking ceases).
- The Court held plaintiffs have Article III standing (concrete injury closely related to unjust enrichment) but found the claims untimely: § 6084 is a statute of repose measured from the defendant’s last culpable act, and plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead trafficking within two years of suit; dismissal granted with leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (Article III) | Plaintiffs allege concrete injury from defendants’ use/exploitation of confiscated property and unjust-enrichment-type harm | Any injury is the original 1960 confiscation (not traceable) or a bare statutory violation insufficiently concrete | Plaintiffs have standing; alleged injury (unjust enrichment/benefit from trafficking) is a concrete, cognizable harm under Spokeo framework |
| Timeliness under § 6084 (statute of repose vs limitations) | § 6084 is a limitations provision and should be subject to tolling; plaintiffs’ claims accrued later or were tolled during presidential suspensions | § 6084 is a statute of repose running from defendant’s last culpable act; plaintiffs alleged last trafficking ended by ~2010, so claims are barred | § 6084 is a statute of repose measured from the defendant’s last culpable act; claims untimely because alleged trafficking ended >2 years before filing |
| Tolling / effect of presidential suspension of Title III | Presidential suspension of Title III tolled the two-year period so plaintiffs could sue within two years after suspension lifted | Suspension only "suspend[s] the right to bring an action" and does not pause the § 6084 repose period | Court rejects tolling; statutory text and purpose show suspension does not extend § 6084, and allowing tolling would undermine Congress’s deterrent purpose |
| Continuing trafficking / pleading adequacy | Complaint alleges ongoing trafficking and conversions (e.g., renewals, conversion to Euros) supporting timeliness | Allegations of post-2010 trafficking are conclusory or relate to acts outside the scope pleaded; facts show primary activity ended by 2010 | Allegations of continuing trafficking are conclusory and insufficiently particular to plausibly show timely trafficking; dismissal appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (statutory violation alone insufficient; injury must be concrete or Congress must elevate intangible harm)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing elements and burden across litigation stages)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards; courts need not accept conclusory allegations)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading requirement)
- California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017) (statutes of repose generally not subject to equitable tolling)
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (2014) (purpose and effect of statutes of repose)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (standing is a threshold jurisdictional question)
- Police & Fire Retirement System of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (statute-of-repose principles; repose not subject to equitable tolling)
- Loreley Financial (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, 797 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015) (leave to amend standards)