Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600

Two noncitizens—Jean Francois Pugin (Virginia conviction: accessory after the fact) and Fernando Cordero‑Garcia (California conviction: dissuading a witness from reporting a crime)—were charged by DHS as removable for convictions constituting aggravated felonies “relating to obstruction of justice.”
Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals sided with the Government; the Fourth Circuit upheld removal for Pugin, while the Ninth Circuit rejected removal for Cordero‑Garcia on the ground that his offense did not require a pending investigation or proceeding.
The legal question presented was whether an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S) must require a pending investigation or official proceeding to qualify as an aggravated felony.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split about whether obstruction offenses that can occur before any investigation or proceeding are included in the aggravated‑felony definition.
The Court framed the analysis through the INA’s categorical approach (compare elements of the state statute with the generic federal offense) and surveyed dictionaries, federal statutes, state laws, and the Model Penal Code to determine the ordinary meaning of “obstruction of justice.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S) requires a pending investigation or proceeding	Pugin / Cordero‑Garcia: Yes — the term should be read consistent with §1503 and historical usage requiring pendency; otherwise the provision is overbroad and creates redundancies; invoke rule of lenity	Government (AG): No — “relating to” covers offenses connected to obstruction even if no investigation/proceeding is pending; dictionaries, federal/state statutes, and the MPC show obstruction can precede official proceedings; mens rea limits overbreadth	Held: No — an offense can “relate to obstruction of justice” without a pending investigation or proceeding; intent requirements and the phrase “relating to” cabin the category; affirmed Fourth Circuit, reversed Ninth Circuit and remanded

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopted the categorical approach — compare statutory elements to the generic offense)
Esquivel‑Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385 (2017) (used contemporary meanings and dictionaries to define generic offenses under the INA)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical‑approach framework for immigration consequences)
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893) (historical decision holding certain obstruction statutes required pendency of proceedings)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (interpreted §1503 to require knowledge of a pending proceeding)
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (plurality) (recognized that some obstruction statutes reach acts intended to impede investigations not yet underway)
Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282 (2016) (described when the rule of lenity applies: only after exhausting traditional interpretive tools)