Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Sistema De Retiro De Los Empleados Del Gobierno Y La Judicatura
637 F.3d 10
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Intervenor-appellants are twenty current/former Puerto Rico Telephone Co. employees seeking to intervene in a suit where the district court declared Act 234 preempted by ERISA by consent of the parties.
- Act 234 allows eligible PRTC employees to switch back to the government-run Sistema de Retiro plan, subject to repayment of past contributions with interest and a specified payment plan.
- PRTC sued to have Act 234 preempted by ERISA; the district court granted a declaratory judgment to the same effect based on the parties’ consent, and intervention was denied without explanation.
- Intervenors argued they should be allowed to participate to challenge the preemption ruling; the district court gave no rationale for denial and did not conduct a hearing.
- The First Circuit remanded to determine whether to allow intervention now or to permit their separate action, emphasizing a full opportunity to litigate the preemption issue.
- The court stated it did not decide the merits of ERISA preemption and that intervention should be considered to give Intervenors a meaningful chance to press their Act 234 claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness and prejudice of intervention | Intervenors untimely; delay prejudices existing parties. | Timeliness is a discretionary matter; district court has deference. | Remand for reconsideration; timeliness analysis required with prejudice factors. |
| Interest and likelihood that disposition would impair intervenors' ability to protect their interests | Intervenors have a direct interest in Act 234’s status. | No meaningful interest affected by the judgment. | Intervenors have a protectable interest warranting further consideration on remand. |
| Adequacy of representation by existing parties | Existing parties should adequately represent all interests. | Representations are adequate; intervention unnecessary. | Adequacy not clearly satisfied; remand to assess representation concerns. |
| Effect of a consent-declared preemption judgment on intervenors | Judgment rests on parties’ consent and should bind those parties. | Judgment should extinguish the issue as to all; intervenors not adversaries. | Consent judgment does not preclude meaningful relitigation; remand to permit intervention or separate action. |
| Proper path to adjudicate Act 234 preemption | Intervention unnecessary; separate action is sufficient. | Intervention or separate action could be efficient; district court may choose either. | Intervenors entitled to one opportunity to litigate preemption, via intervention or separate action; remand to decide mechanism. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987) (timeliness measures prejudice, not a rigid time constraint)
- R&G Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Loan Mortgage Corp., 584 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009) (intervention standards and abuse-of-discretion review)
- Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227 (1st Cir. 1992) (timeliness measured by prejudice to existing parties)
- Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980) (purpose of timeliness to prevent prejudice and delays)
- NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (U.S. 1973) (late intervention may disrupt proceedings; timeliness concerns prejudice)
- Geiger v. Foley Hoag LLP Ret. Plan, 521 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (timeliness weighed against prejudice to determine intervention)
- Langton v. Hogan, 71 F.3d 930 (1st Cir. 1995) (litigation efficiency and intervenor rights considerations)
