Publicola v. Lomenzo, 22-795

Background

Appellant (pro se, using the pseudonym “Publius Publicola”) filed a §1983 suit challenging publication of a Penfield Town Court order that included his full name and his unsuccessful efforts to have underlying juvenile records sealed.
The district court denied his motion to proceed under a pseudonym and dismissed all claims (failure to state a claim, Rooker–Feldman, immunity, statutes of limitations).
On appeal Appellant filed briefs and other submissions signed with his pseudonym and did not disclose his real name to the Court.
This Court ordered Appellant to refile his briefs under his real name and said he could move to file sealed versions if he could overcome the presumption of public access.
Appellant refused to comply with the order and argued he need not disclose his real name or file a new motion in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that signing filings under a pseudonym does not satisfy Fed. R. App. P. 32(d) and, because Appellant refused to comply with the rule and the court’s order, dismissed the appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether signing appellate papers under a pseudonym satisfies Fed. R. App. P. 32(d)	He may sign his filings as he chooses; Rule 32(d) only concerns a signature’s presence	Rule 32(d) requires an identifiable party or attorney to be accountable for filings	No — pseudonymous signatures do not make the filer readily identifiable and thus do not satisfy Rule 32(d).
Whether Appellant could avoid re-filing or seeking relief in this Court because he already sought pseudonym relief below	The district-court denial is appealable; it’s unreasonable to require a separate motion in the Court of Appeals	Appellant must seek appellate-level relief here because Rule 32(d) and appellate practice are separate; the Court can entertain motions in the first instance	Requiring a motion in the Court of Appeals is appropriate; Section 1291 does not bar motions to the appellate court.
Whether Sealed Plaintiff established a right to proceed anonymously here	Sealed Plaintiff supports anonymity and vacatur of dismissal in similar circumstances	Sealed Plaintiff recognizes only limited exceptions to disclosure and requires balancing; it does not create an absolute right	Sealed Plaintiff does not compel anonymity; exceptions are limited and require disclosure to the court and parties or a specific balancing showing.
Whether refusal to disclose identity or to comply with the Court’s order warrants dismissal	Refusal to disclose should not automatically lead to dismissal of the appeal	Rule 3(a)(2) and precedent permit dismissal when an appellant fails to take required steps or comply with court orders	Dismissal was warranted: refusal to comply with Rule 32(d) and the Court’s order justified dismissal under Rule 3(a)(2) and controlling precedent.

Key Cases Cited

Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that party-name disclosure is the norm and anonymity is a limited exception requiring balancing)
McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2017) (pro se filings are construed liberally but pro se litigants must follow court orders)
McDonald v. Head Criminal Court Supervisor Officer, 850 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1988) (pro se litigants must comply with court orders; failure can justify dismissal)
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (articulating presumption of public access to judicial records and standard for overcoming it)
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (U.S. 2008) (noting preclusion and the need to know parties’ identities to give preclusive effect to prior judgments)
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1984) (discussing preclusive effect of state-court judgments between the same parties)
United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2020) (cited regarding appealability and interlocutory/collateral-order principles)
In re McKenzie, 180 U.S. 536 (U.S. 1901) (recognizing appellate courts’ inherent power to act on motions presented to them)
Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (U.S. 1942) (discussing inherent judicial powers necessary for administration of justice)