Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State
2013 Fla. LEXIS 1038
Fla.2013Background
- Public Defender filed conflict motions in 21 non-capital felony cases alleging excessive caseload due to underfunding, seeking to decline appointments or obtain new counsel.
- Trial court consolidated the motions, allowed amicus participation, and ordered decline in future third-degree felonies while still handling arraignments.
- Third District reversed several aspects, held office-wide relief may be appropriate, and remanded for current factual assessment.
- This Court granted review to address whether 27.5303(l)(d) prohibiting withdrawal based solely on funding/workload is constitutional and whether aggregate relief is permissible.
- Court also addressed whether the State has standing to oppose motions and whether the relief should be prospective or individualized.
- Key factual context includes widespread understaffing, rising caseloads, and evidence of triage and delayed preparation across the Eleventh Circuit Public Defender’s Office.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality and applicability of 27.5303(l)(d) | Public Defender argues l(d) is facially unconstitutional and blocks necessary aggregate relief. | Bowens/State contend l(d) bars withdrawal solely on funding/workload, but allows other grounds. | Facially constitutional but not to preclude aggregate relief; may be applied with limitations. |
| Scope of relief under 27.5303 | Office-wide relief is necessary due to systemic caseload/underfunding. | Relief must be case-by-case, not office-wide. | Aggregate/systemic relief appropriate when there is a wide-scale problem and individualized relief would be impracticable. |
| Standard for withdrawal under 27.5303 | Prejudice or risk to rights can be shown on a broader, future-harm basis. | Prejudice must be shown on an individualized basis; future harm insufficient. | Prejudice includes substantial risk that representation will be limited by workload; requires individualized, fact-based showing to withdraw. |
| Constitutional rights and authority | Court has inherent authority to safeguard rights and permit aggregate relief. | Statute respects separation of powers and ethics rules; court should defer. | Inherent authority allows protective relief; statute facially constitutional but cannot bar necessary relief. |
| Standing of State Attorney’s Office | State has standing to oppose conflicts as a party. | Standing limited; RCC not a party. | State has standing to challenge PD motions; RCC standing aligned with Johnson v. State. |
Key Cases Cited
- Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1994) (withdrawal based on conflicts requires separate representation when conflicts arise)
- Behr v. Behr, 384 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1980) (office-wide relief recognized; backlog can justify withdrawal)
- Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644 (Fla. 2002) (trial courts may exceed fee caps to ensure adequate representation (capital cases))
- Olive v. Maas, in re Olive II, 992 So.2d 196 (Fla. 2008) (inherent judicial authority supports remedy beyond statutory caps)
- In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw Filed by Public Defender of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, 636 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1994) (recognizes conflicts due to excessive caseload; prospective withdrawal allowed)
- In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1990) (backlog and underfunding can create conflicts affecting representation)
- Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988) (prospective relief allowed; likelihood of irreparable harm standard for injunctive relief)
- Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 (N.Y. Ct. App.) (2010) (public defender system deficiencies may amount to non-representation and denial of effective counsel)