Pryor v. City of Clearlake, 877 F. Supp. 2d 929

Pryor, a mentally ill African American man, was shot and tased by Clearlake Police Department officers on Sept. 30, 2009 at Pryor’s residence shared with his mother.
Pryor alleged multiple §1983 claims including Fourth Amendment, due process, equal protection, privacy; Monell claim against City; assault and battery; IIED; negligence; negligent hiring/training/supervision; and statutory privacy-code claims; and ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all but Pryor’s excessive force claim against Officer Miller; Pryor did not oppose on several claims.
Court granted summary judgment on Pryor’s fourth through tenth claims and on most §1983 and assault/battery issues; some §1983 excessive force issues against Ray, Clausen, and McClain/City denied or reserved.
Key events at scene: entry into Pryor’s home without a warrant considered under consent, exigent circumstances, and collateral estoppel from a prior suppression ruling; Pryor’s brother Ayatch had a key and authority to consent per Matlock/related doctrine; taser use followed gunfire, with contested timing and warnings; police policies and expert testimony offered but insufficient to create genuine dispute on certain claims; Monell liability analyzed for training, hiring, and custom arguments; final conclusions include grant of some judgments for City and officers, with Miller’s excessive force claim to proceed to trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether collateral estoppel bars relitigation of entry legality	Pryor argues prior suppression ruling precludes relitigation	Defendants contend estoppel applies to lawfulness of entry	Collateral estoppel applies; entry legality upheld
Excessive force by Ray (two taser uses)	Ray used taser unreasonably and unlawfully	Taser use justified by immediate threat; qualified immunity may apply	First taser use may be reasonable; second taser use disputed; Ray entitled to qualified immunity on both tasing events; McClain/Clausen not liable for excessive force
Monell liability for City (training, hiring, custom)	City’s negligent training/hiring and toleration of bigotry caused rights violations	Insufficient evidence of genuine Monell policy or custom causing Pryor’s injury	City entitled to summary judgment on Monell claim
Due process and equal protection claims	Claims rely on Fourth Amendment conduct; fifth/fourteenth due process or equal protection implicated	Fourth Amendment analysis controls; substantive due process not viable	Summary judgment granted on due process and equal protection claims
Zone of privacy under Fourth/Ninth Amends	Pryor’s privacy rights implicated by entry/force	No viable privacy claim distinct from Fourth Amendment analysis	Adjudicated against Pryor; no viable zone of privacy claim

Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1990) (collateral estoppel and constitutional rights in civil actions)
Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1997) (collateral estoppel prerequisites; party in privity)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (Supreme Court 1973) (consent exception to warrant requirement)
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (Supreme Court 1974) (apparent/common authority for third-party consent)
Randolph v. Georgia, 547 U.S. 103 (Supreme Court 2006) (co-tenant consent when present and objecting varies by context)
Ryburn v. Huff, — S. Ct. 987 (2012) (emergency/community caretaking exception reasonableness)
Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010) (taser in dart-mode constitutes intermediate force; need for justification)
Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011) (provocation or escalation considerations in excessive force)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (Supreme Court 1989) (deliberate indifference standard for Monell claims)
Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010) (intermediate force standard for taser use; notice to officers)