286 F. Supp. 3d 471
E.D.N.Y.2017Background
- Pryor, a long-time disability beneficiary, challenged the SSA's inclusion of $15,922.54 in alleged 2008 earnings attributed to work at Parking Systems, which the ALJ upheld.
- The Appeals Council denied review; the district court affirmed the ALJ on March 22, 2016 after considering the administrative record and limited new evidence.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the district court on March 8, 2017 and denied rehearing on June 20, 2017.
- Over a year after the district-court judgment, Pryor filed a “motion to reopen,” which the court construed as a Rule 60(b)(2) motion seeking relief based on newly discovered evidence of identity theft.
- Pryor submitted IRS identity-theft documents (dated 2016–2017) and a Google printout; the court found the IRS materials duplicative or not clearly tied to 2008 earnings and the printout irrelevant.
- The court denied the motion as untimely under Rule 60(c)(1)’s one-year limit and, alternatively, because the proffered evidence would not likely have changed the outcome given the ALJ’s other supportive evidence (e.g., eyewitness observation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court should reopen the final judgment based on newly discovered evidence (Rule 60(b)(2)) | Pryor: IRS identity-theft findings and other documents show earnings were fraudulent and would change the judgment | Commissioner: Motion is untimely and evidence is duplicative or immaterial to 2008 earnings; appellate filing does not toll the Rule 60 deadline | Denied: motion is time-barred (filed >1 year after judgment); evidence would not probably change the result |
| Whether the proffered evidence qualifies as "newly discovered" | Pryor: He lacked the favorable IRS determination earlier and only later obtained documents | Commissioner: Many documents were available or duplicative of materials already considered; plaintiff lacked diligence | Denied: Documents were duplicative, cumulative, or unrelated to 2008 earnings and not sufficiently probative |
| Whether an appeal to the Second Circuit tolled the one-year Rule 60(b) deadline | Pryor: sought relief after appeal and appellate rulings | Commissioner: Filing an appeal does not toll the one-year period | Held: Appeal does not toll the one-year limit; Rule 60(c)(1) deadline is absolute |
| Whether other procedural remedies (e.g., Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(6)) apply | Pryor: generally sought to reopen the case | Commissioner: Specific rules apply and limitations bar relief; separate administrative remedies for overpayment exist | Held: Rule 59(e) untimely; Rule 60(b)(6) inapplicable because Rule 60(b)(2) governs; overpayment claims must follow administrative exhaustion |
Key Cases Cited
- Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015) (courts must liberally construe pro se filings)
- Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2003) (Rule 60(b)(2) standard for newly discovered evidence)
- United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2001) (new evidence must not be merely cumulative and must likely change outcome)
- Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 466 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2006) (one-year limitation for Rule 60(b) motions is absolute)
- King v. First Am. Investigations, Inc., 287 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (appeal does not toll Rule 60(b) one-year limit)
- Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1989) (Rule 60(b)(6) only when more specific Rule 60(b) grounds are inapplicable)