Pryor, Donna Marie, PD-1005-15

Donna Marie Pryor was stopped by a Comal County deputy who testified she failed to signal for at least 100 feet before turning, leading to a DWI arrest; a deputy in‑car video of the encounter was admitted at trial.
Pryor requested an Article 38.23 jury instruction (exclude evidence obtained in violation of law) based on a factual dispute whether she signaled; the trial court denied the request.
A jury convicted Pryor of DWI with prior convictions and assessed punishment at 99 years; the Third Court of Appeals affirmed.
Pryor argued on discretionary review that the appellate court inadequately examined the video evidence and thus wrongly concluded no factual dispute existed requiring an Article 38.23 charge.
The appellate opinion also addressed and rejected Pryor’s claim that certain prosecutor comments about parole during punishment phase warranted reversal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by refusing an Art. 38.23 jury instruction about the lawfulness of the stop	Pryor: the in‑car video affirmatively contested the deputy’s testimony about signaling and raised a factual issue material to the stop’s legality, so the jury should decide exclusion	State: the controlling question is whether the deputy had reasonable suspicion; the video does not clearly show the deputy’s belief was unreasonable	Court of Appeals: no error — video did not affirmatively contest deputy’s testimony or show lack of reasonable suspicion, so no Art. 38.23 instruction required
Whether prosecutor’s punishment‑phase comments about parole were improper and harmful	Pryor: prosecutor urged the jury to consider when she would actually be released on parole, contrary to the court’s instruction, and that prejudice warrants reversal	State: arguments explained parole law; jury received statutory instruction about parole law and good conduct time	Court of Appeals: comments were improper (went beyond explaining charge) but nonconstitutional; after balancing severity, curative measures, and certainty of punishment, any error did not affect substantial rights; no reversal

Guerrero v. State, 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (due process considerations on appellate review)
Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Article 38.23 submission requirements and focus on officer’s reasonable belief)
State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (officer must have reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop)
Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (three‑part test for Article 38.23 jury instruction)
Mills v. State, 296 S.W.3d 843 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009) (distinguished — officer equivocation plus video can raise material fact for Article 38.23)
Branch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011) (permitted explanation of parole eligibility in argument but not speculation on actual release)
Taylor v. State, 233 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (jury may consider parole eligibility but not speculate when release will occur)
Mahaffey v. State, 316 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (definition/interpretation of a "turn" under traffic law)