Pruett, Jeffery Lynn
2017 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 81
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Appellant Jeffery Pruett was convicted of arson after intentionally igniting a fire at the back of a residential house in Fort Worth; the jury also made a deadly-weapon finding.
- A neighbor observed Pruett arrive, return from the backyard carrying something, drive off, and moments later smoke was seen coming from the house.
- An arson investigator testified the fire was set intentionally with an accelerant, was left unattended, and was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury due to heat, toxic emissions, and potential spread.
- Neighbors partially suppressed the fire with a garden hose before firefighters arrived; no one was killed or seriously injured and firefighters extinguished the remainder.
- The court of appeals reversed the deadly-weapon finding, reasoning no one was actually harmed and firefighters were not shown to have been in actual danger.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed statutory meaning of "deadly weapon" and examined whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the fire was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the fire constituted a "deadly weapon" under Tex. Penal Code §1.07(a)(17)(B) | The fire, started with an accelerant and left unattended in a residential area, was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and thus qualifies as a deadly weapon. | The fire did not actually kill or seriously injure anyone and firefighters/neighbors were not shown to have been in actual danger, so a deadly-weapon finding is unsupported. | The Court held the fire was a deadly weapon because its manner of use made it capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; actual injury is not required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1980) (establishes the standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (interpreting the "capable of causing" language of the deadly-weapon definition)
- Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (deadly-weapon definition includes instruments that threaten or cause serious bodily injury even if not inherently deadly)
- Pruett v. State, 484 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015) (court of appeals decision reversing deadly-weapon finding below)
- Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (vehicle-as-deadly-weapon analysis emphasizing fact-specific manner-of-use inquiry)