242 Cal. App. 4th 1367
Cal. Ct. App.2015Background
- Prue sued Brady for wrongful termination in violation of public policy after his July 2011 termination following a work-related hernia and alleged musculoskeletal/psychological injuries.
- His complaint referenced FEHA (Gov. Code § 12900 et seq.) and alleged Brady knew of his disability, gave work restrictions, Prue requested accommodations (light duty, fewer days, assistance), and was nonetheless terminated.
- Brady moved for summary judgment arguing (a) Prue pleaded only a Labor Code § 132a claim (barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity and/or the § 132a one-year limitations period), (b) Prue failed to plead a statutory public policy under FEHA, and (c) amendment would be prejudicial and untimely.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding Prue had not pled a public policy under FEHA and that any claim was time-barred by FEHA’s one-year statute of limitations; the court denied leave to amend.
- The Court of Appeal reviewed de novo, treated the motion as a challenge to the pleading, and examined whether the complaint adequately alleged a Tameny wrongful-termination claim tethered to FEHA and whether FEHA’s one-year limitations applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint pleaded a common-law wrongful termination claim based on FEHA public policy | Prue argued the complaint alleged FEHA-based disability discrimination (disability, qualification, adverse action, employer knowledge) and thus stated a Tameny claim | Brady argued the complaint alleged only a § 132a claim (or was otherwise insufficient to plead a FEHA-based tort) | Held: Complaint sufficiently alleged a Tameny wrongful-termination claim tethered to FEHA disability policy; Brady was on notice of FEHA-based theory |
| Whether workers’ compensation exclusivity or Labor Code § 132a precluded the common-law claim | Prue argued § 132a is not exclusive and FEHA/common-law remedies remain available for disability discrimination | Brady argued § 132a or exclusivity principles barred the tort claim | Held: § 132a is not an exclusive remedy; FEHA/common-law wrongful termination claims may proceed (Moorpark controlling) |
| Which statute of limitations applies to the common-law Tameny claim tethered to FEHA | Prue argued the general tort limitations (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 — two years) governs wrongful-termination tort claims | Brady argued FEHA’s one-year limitations for private FEHA actions applies to the tethered tort claim, making it untimely | Held: FEHA’s one-year private-action limitation is a procedural limit on statutory remedies and does not govern the substantive common-law tort; two-year tort statute applies, so Prue’s claim was timely |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend | Prue sought leave to amend to clarify FEHA-based allegations | Brady asserted delay and prejudice justified denial | Held: Court need not decide because original pleading was adequate; but even if inadequate, denial of leave to amend would have been an abuse of discretion (plaintiff should be allowed to amend) |
Key Cases Cited
- Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (Cal. 1980) (establishes common-law tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy)
- City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1143 (Cal. 1998) (FEHA delineates a substantial public policy against disability discrimination; § 132a not exclusive)
- Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 880 (Cal. 1997) (distinguishes substantive statutory prohibitions from procedural limitations for tethered common-law claims)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (Cal. 2001) (summary judgment burdens and framework)
- Carmichael v. Alfano Temporary Personnel, 233 Cal.App.3d 1126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (FEHA limitations do not bar independent common-law discrimination claims)
- Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., 43 Cal.App.4th 1200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (applies general tort limitations to Tameny wrongful termination actions)
Disposition: Reversed judgment for defendant; remanded with directions to deny summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim (but to grant summary adjudication for the other causes); plaintiff awarded costs on appeal.