505 P.3d 81
Utah Ct. App.2022Background
- Incident at appellant Melvin Bishop-Garcia’s duplex in Provo: restaurant employee (pseudonym “Laura”) went next door to retrieve ice; Bishop-Garcia and Laura offer conflicting accounts of ensuing physical contact.
- Laura testified that Bishop-Garcia grabbed her breast and buttocks, she escaped and reported the incident; Bishop-Garcia testified the contact was consensual/benign and he followed to calm her.
- The restaurant owner and the responding police officer both testified at trial and, when asked, stated they believed Laura and found her credible. The officer also said he arrested Bishop-Garcia because Laura’s statement was consistent while Bishop-Garcia’s statement had inconsistencies.
- Defense counsel made no objections to these statements; prosecutor emphasized the owner’s and officer’s belief in Laura during rebuttal closing.
- Jury convicted Bishop-Garcia of unlawful detention and sexual battery; the Court of Appeals vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding counsel was ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible credibility testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility under Utah R. Evid. 608(a) of witnesses stating belief/credibility of another witness on a particular occasion | Owner’s and officer’s direct statements that they "believed" or found Laura "credible" were impermissible bolstering of a witness’s truthfulness on a specific occasion | Testimony was either incidental or obvious to jurors (e.g., friend would believe her; arrest implied credibility), so not prejudicial | Testimony was inadmissible under Rule 608(a); each instance merited objection |
| Whether failure to object constituted deficient performance by trial counsel (Strickland standard) | Failure to object to obviously inadmissible testimony—elicited by direct, improper questions—fell below objective professional norms and was not a reasonable strategy | Counsel could have declined to object as a tactical choice to expose inconsistencies in Laura’s story during cross-exam and closing | Counsel’s failure to object was objectively unreasonable and therefore deficient; no reasonable strategic justification given centrality of credibility |
| Prejudice: whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error | This was a pure credibility contest with no corroboration; the owner’s and officer’s bolstering likely affected the jury’s assessment and thus the verdict | Other evidence (actions, emotional state, alleged inconsistencies) supported conviction and made any error harmless | Prejudice shown: given the centrality of credibility, the prosecutor’s emphasis on improper testimony, and lack of corroboration, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome; convictions vacated and new trial ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two-part ineffective-assistance test)
- State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000) (Rule 608(a) bars testimony about a witness’s truthfulness on a particular occasion)
- State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (admission of testimony that a victim was "truthful" was plainly erroneous)
- State v. Cegers, 440 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (impermissible bolstering where witness opined a victim would not fabricate allegations)
- State v. Ray, 469 P.3d 871 (Utah 2020) (ineffective-assistance review considers whether counsel failed to fight battles competent counsel would have fought)
- State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) (prejudice inquiry can be satisfied without meeting a more-probable-than-not threshold)