Prost v. Anderson
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3461
| 10th Cir. | 2011Background
- Prost pleaded guilty in 1999 to drug conspiracy and money-laundering counts, and challenged his sentence in § 2255 proceedings; Santos (2008) redefined “proceeds” to mean profits for § 1956; Prost later filed a § 2241 habeas petition arguing Santos should undo his conviction; AEDPA § 2255(h) bars second or successive § 2255 motions absent listed exceptions; Prost invoked § 2255(e) savings clause claiming § 2255 was inadequate to test detention; district court in Colorado debated venue and remedy, ultimately rejecting the § 2241 route; the panel affirmed the district court’s decision and held Prost could not demonstrate the savings clause applied; the panel noted conclusively that finality concerns foreclose relitigation absent one of the § 2255(h) exceptions; Prost may still face collateral consequences if successful, and Santos applies to pre-amendment conduct only.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2255(e) savings clause allows §2241 relief here | Prost argues savings clause applies due to inadequate §2255 remedy | United States contends savings clause not satisfied; §2255(h) bars second motion | No; savings clause not satisfied; §2255 remedy adequate; finality controls |
| Whether novelty or erroneous circuit foreclosure tests govern savings clause | Prost proposes novelty or circuit-foreclosure tests to access §2241 | Gov’t argues these tests misread the clause and Congress intended limits | Neither novelty nor erroneous-foreclosure tests control; text and context favor conventional AEDPA limits |
| Does Santos retroactively void Prost’s conviction | Santos shows proceeds = profits, undermining his guilt | Merely a change in law; not actionable via §2241 unless savings clause satisfied | Santos does not render Prost’s conviction non-existent under applicable review scheme |
| Is Prost foregone relief due to circuit precedent at time of first §2255 motion | Foregone argument due to circuit law; should access §2241 | Foreclosure by circuit precedent lacks bearing on savings clause adequacy | Foreclosure alone does not grant §2241 relief; relies on §2255 adequacy framework |
| Should constitutional avoidance or other theoretical routes rescue §2241 access | Second/Third Circuit routes could permit §2241 access | We decline broad constitutional-based exceptions to AEDPA limits | Not decided here; the majority declines expanding savings clause beyond current bounds |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (U.S. 2008) (defines proceeds as profits for money-laundering statute)
- Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164 (10th Cir.1996) (remedial adequacy of §2255 not shown by mere denial of relief)
- Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (U.S. 1977) (finality and due process in criminal convictions)
- Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (U.S. 1952) (origin of habeas corpus and venue consolidation under §2255)
- In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir.1998) (courts may permit §2241 access when circuit law forecloses relief)
- Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893 (5th Cir.2001) (two-part circuit-foreclosure test for savings clause relief)
- Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir.1997) (savings clause available when intervening change in substantive law)
- Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir.1997) (conceptual framework for savings clause in Bailey context)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (U.S. 1998) (actual innocence exception to procedural bars)
- Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1974) (test for new grounds and retroactivity in habeas context)