92 N.E.3d 649
Ind. Ct. App.2017Background
- Randy L. Hammer, a Hendricks County resident, had six active driving suspensions in Nov. 2016, three imposed by the BMV and three resulting from convictions (two in Hendricks County, one in Morgan County for felony habitual traffic violator).
- Hammer filed a petition in Hendricks Superior Court seeking specialized driving privileges under Indiana Code §§ 9-30-16-3 and -4 to stay all suspensions for work-related driving.
- The Hendricks court treated all suspensions as administratively imposed and granted specialized driving privileges for all suspensions on Jan. 18, 2017, over the BMV’s objection concerning the Morgan County conviction-related suspension.
- Three months later the BMV filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion arguing the Hendricks court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a suspension imposed by Morgan Superior Court (and, for the first time, challenged jurisdiction over suspensions from other Hendricks courts); the trial court denied relief as an untimely/collateral attack.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the Hendricks Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear petitions for specialized driving privileges and that any error in filing venue/statutory interpretation was a legal error that should have been raised on direct appeal, not by collateral 60(B) attack.
Issues
| Issue | BMV's Argument | Hammer's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hendricks Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant specialized driving privileges for a suspension tied to a Morgan County habitual-traffic-violator conviction | Court lacked jurisdiction over another court’s order; judgment void and attackable collaterally | Suspension was administrative; petition properly filed in resident’s county (Hendricks) under I.C. § 9-30-16-4 | Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear petitions for specialized privileges; alleged statutory/venue error is legal, not jurisdictional, error |
| Whether BMV may use Trial Rule 60(B) to vacate the judgment as void | 60(B) motion properly challenges jurisdiction and thus renders judgment void | BMV failed to appeal; 60(B) is an improper collateral attack on a judgment where only legal error (not true lack of jurisdiction) is alleged | 60(B) motion was an improper collateral attack; denial of relief affirmed; BMV forfeited direct-appeal rights |
Key Cases Cited
- K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 2006) (distinguishes true jurisdictional defects that render judgments void from mere procedural/legal errors that must be raised on direct appeal)
- Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. 2000) (defines subject-matter jurisdiction as power over the general class of actions)
- Mishler v. County of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 1989) (historical rule that judgments by a court with subject-matter and personal jurisdiction are not collaterally impeachable)
- In re Adoption of J.T.D., 21 N.E.3d 824 (Ind. 2014) (subject-matter jurisdiction is generally created by statute or constitution)
- Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (judgment void under Trial Rule 60(B)(6) where court truly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction)
- N. Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist. v. Chicago SouthShore and South Bend R.R., 685 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. 1997) (recognizes statutory/constitutional sources of jurisdiction)