Propp v. Counterpart International
39 A.3d 856
D.C.2012Background
- Propp sues Counterpart International and LeLei LeLaulu alleging DCHRA retaliation and discrimination.
- He was terminated on Oct. 12, 2004 after being told there were four termination/ severance options, some conditioned on a release of claims.
- Two severance options did not require a release; Propp declined all options and was terminated without severance.
- Counterpart later indicated it would negotiate a consulting agreement but only if Propp signed a broad release of all claims.
- Counterpart purportedly abandoned funding for Propp's Counterpart Communities initiative after Propp complained of discrimination.
- The trial court granted summary judgment on retaliation; the DC Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial on retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there a prima facie case of retaliation under DCHRA? | Propp showed protected activity, adverse action, and causation. | Counterpart argues no prima facie retaliation due to business reasons. | Yes, a prima facie case was established. |
| Did Counterpart offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions? | Counterpart's reliance on prudence and funding concerns is pretextual. | There were legitimate business reasons for not pursuing funding and for conditioning negotiations on a release. | Counterpart proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, but issues of pretext remained for jury. |
| Is there a causal connection between protected activity and the adverse actions? | Timing and conduct show retaliation after discrimination claim. | Actions were motivated by prudent business decisions, not retaliation. | Yes, the record supports a causal link for purposes of summary judgment. |
| Can the retaliation claim survive under McDonnell Douglas pretext framework? | Evidence could show pretext and retaliatory motive. | Business justifications could defeat pretext. | Issue of material fact exists; summary judgment reversed and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 (D.C.1993) (McDonnell Douglas framework applies to retaliation under DCHRA)
- Chang v. Institute for Public-Private Partnerships, Inc., 846 A.2d 318 (D.C.2004) ( McDonnell Douglas standard applied to retaliation claims)
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (adverse action standard involves materially adverse actions that could dissuade complaints)
- U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 444 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Md. 2006) (release demands can be facially retaliatory; no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason shown)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes the burden-shifting framework for retaliation cases)
