PROGRESSIVE ELDERCARE SERVICES-DREW, INC., D/B/A BELLE VIEW REHABILITATION AND CARE CENTER; Progressive Eldercare Services, Inc.; Advanced Practice Solutions, LLC; Procare Therapy Services, LLC; Southern Administrative Services, LLC; Ponthie Holdings, LLC; Professional Nursing Solutions, LLC; CarePlus Staffing Services, LLC; Ross Ponthie; John Ponthie; And Marlene Hensley, in Her Capacity as Administrator of Belle View Estates Rehabilitation and Care Center v. ANGELA EVERETT, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF LAVARN TURNER, AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF LAVARN TURNER, 635 S.W.3d 502

Lavarn Turner executed a power of attorney (POA) in 2012 naming his daughter, Angela Everett, as agent; the POA contains specific grants re: banking, a particular real property, and a clause stating she may act "in all matters that the Principal would normally represent himself in," followed by a sentence about "personal possessions."
Turner was admitted to Belle View Estates (PES) in 2013; Everett signed the facility admission and arbitration agreements as his representative.
Turner died in 2017; in 2019 Everett (as special administrator) sued PES for negligence, malpractice, breach of contract, and DTPA violations.
PES moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement Everett signed on Turner’s behalf, arguing the POA gave her general authority under Ark. Code Ann. § 28-68-201(c).
The circuit court denied the motion and reconsideration, finding the POA wording problematic/equivocal and not an unambiguous general grant of authority to bind Turner to arbitration.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo whether the POA authorized Everett to sign an arbitration agreement for Turner and affirmed the denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Turner's POA constituted a general grant of authority under Ark. Code § 28-68-201(c) authorizing Everett to bind him to arbitration	POA limited to banking, specified real property, and personal possessions; it did not grant general authority to agree to arbitration	The clause "in all matters that the Principal would normally represent himself in" creates a § 28-68-201(c) general grant that includes arbitration authority	POA does not unambiguously grant general authority; taken as a whole it more naturally limits authority to specified subjects and does not authorize Everett to bind Turner to arbitration
Whether the POA is ambiguous and requires extrinsic evidence or is a matter of law for the court	POA wording creates a restrictive list; ambiguous language supports plaintiff's view it was not a general grant	Defendant urges statutory construction under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act to treat the phrase as a general grant	Court found the instrument "problematic and equivocal" but concluded, as a matter of law, that the POA could reasonably be read as limited; thus no valid arbitration agreement was formed

Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Phillips, 586 S.W.3d 624 (Ark. 2019) (FAA governs arbitration; de novo review of denial to compel arbitration)
Malvern Operations, LLC v. Moss, 605 S.W.3d 291 (Ark. App. 2020) (POA with limited/ambiguous wording did not create general authority to sign arbitration)
Courtyard Gardens Health v. Williamson, 509 S.W.3d 685 (Ark. App. 2016) (agent lacked authority to sign arbitration where statutory POA did not grant claims/litigation authority)