197 Conn.App. 696
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background:
- Procurement, LLC (plaintiff) proposed a mixed‑use development in Stamford and submitted multiple zoning applications (first, second, third) for special exceptions and site approvals.
- Gurpreet Ahuja (defendant) intervened/appealed the board’s decisions: she sought to intervene in the appeal of the first application, appealed the board’s approval of the second application (arguing inadequate notice and material changes), and appealed the board’s approval of the third application (arguing lack of abutter notice and a missing traffic impact study).
- The second application was approved by the board and Ahuja’s appeal to Superior Court was denied; the third application was approved but Ahuja’s Superior Court appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds (failure to return within statutory time).
- Procurement sued Ahuja and Ahuja Holdings alleging vexatious litigation, abuse of process, CUTPA violations, aiding and abetting, and tortious interference; defendants moved for summary judgment asserting Noerr‑Pennington immunity.
- The trial court granted summary judgment on counts 1–6, holding Ahuja’s petitioning (zoning appeals) was protected by Noerr‑Pennington and did not fall within the sham exception because the appeals were not objectively baseless; Procurement appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ahuja’s zoning appeals were objectively baseless (Noerr‑Pennington sham exception) | Appeals were baseless because they failed and precedent shows notice continuations need not be republished | Appeals raised plausible statutory/charter and regulatory defects (notice questions; incomplete application) giving probable cause | Court: appeals were not objectively baseless; Noerr‑Pennington immunity applies; summary judgment affirmed |
| Applicability of California Motor (holistic/pattern test) vs. Professional Real Estate Investors (two‑part test) | Multiple related proceedings and alleged nonpetitioning misconduct require holistic California Motor analysis including subjective intent | Apply Professional Real Estate Investors: only examine subjective intent if litigation is objectively baseless | Court: applied Professional Real Estate Investors; California Motor not appropriate here (only three proceedings) |
| Second application — notice of continued hearings claim | Roncari/Carberry indicate no new newspaper notice required for continuations; claim therefore futile | Stamford Charter’s §§ C6‑40‑11 and C6‑40‑12 (use of “additional hearings”) reasonably read to require notice for continuations; appeal had probable cause | Court: reasonable litigant could conclude notice was required under charter; notice claim not objectively baseless |
| Third application — completeness (traffic impact study) claim | Plaintiff argued state road involvement made traffic‑light/traffic study issue primarily DOT’s; no deficiency | City traffic engineer requested a traffic impact study; failure to submit made application noncompliant/incomplete and supported appeal | Court: missing traffic impact study gave a reasonable basis to appeal; third‑application appeal not objectively baseless |
Key Cases Cited
- Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (two‑part sham‑litigation test: objective baselessness first, then subjective intent)
- California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (holistic/pattern test for sham petitions involving repeated baseless claims)
- Zeller v. Consolini, 59 Conn. App. 545 (Conn. App. 2000) (discussing Noerr‑Pennington application in Connecticut and chilling concerns)
- Roncari Indus., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 281 Conn. 66 (Conn. 2007) (notice requirements under General Statutes § 8‑3 and continuations)
- Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying California Motor for a series/pattern of petitions)
- Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1990) (an action is not a sham if at least one claim has objective merit)