289 F. Supp. 3d 676
D. Maryland2018Background
- Proctor obtained a mortgage secured by property in Prince George's County and a state-court foreclosure was prosecuted by substitute trustees; the foreclosure sale was ratified and a judgment of possession entered in favor of Fannie Mae.
- After the state-court ratification and issuance of a writ of possession, Proctor filed this federal suit asserting FDCPA, RESPA, wrongful foreclosure, state torts (e.g., slander, quiet title), civil-rights claims against Sheriff Melvin High, and injunctive relief.
- Defendants: Fannie Mae and Wells Fargo (the “Lenders”), the Substitute Trustees (WBGLMC), and Sheriff High. Proctor abandoned earlier RICO claims in her amended complaint.
- Defendants moved to dismiss; Lenders/Substitute Trustees asserted res judicata (claim preclusion) based on the state foreclosure judgment; Sheriff High argued §1983 and immunity defenses and lack of personal involvement.
- The district court took judicial notice of the state-court foreclosure record and Wachovia/Wells Fargo institutional history, and evaluated Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal (but allowed consideration of res judicata where it clearly appeared on the face of the pleadings).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Proctor's claims against the Lenders and Substitute Trustees are barred by res judicata | Proctor contended Wells Fargo had not proven it was noteholder/privity and that the federal claims should proceed | Defendants argued the foreclosure judgment was final and that the Lenders are in privity with the substitute trustees (successor/servicer), so all claims could have been raised in state court | Court held res judicata applies: parties/privity, same transaction, and final judgment satisfied; claims dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether Sheriff High sued in his official capacity is a “person” under §1983 (or protected by Eleventh Amendment) | Proctor alleged Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendment deprivations by Sheriff High acting under color of law | Sheriff argued he is a State official (not a §1983 “person”) and invoked Eleventh Amendment and quasi-judicial immunity for executing a writ of possession | Court held Sheriff High was acting in his official capacity as a State official re: executing writs, is not a §1983 “person,” and official-capacity claims dismissed (did not reach Eleventh Amendment) |
| Whether Sheriff High is liable in his individual capacity under §1983 (direct or supervisory liability) | Proctor alleged deputies invaded and terrorized tenants and implicated Sheriff High individually and as supervisor | Sheriff argued lack of personal involvement and that supervisor liability requires pleading actual/constructive knowledge plus deliberate indifference and causal link | Court held allegations were conclusory; no factual showing of Sheriff High’s personal involvement or supervisory knowledge/inaction; individual-capacity claims dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether quasi-judicial immunity bars claims against Sheriff High for executing the writ | Proctor argued deputies lacked authority and the sheriff acted unlawfully during evictions | Sheriff invoked immunity for enforcement of a facially valid court order; court may treat non-judicial officers enforcing court orders as quasi-judicially immune | Court noted quasi-judicial immunity would bar the claims and cited precedent, but dismissed primarily on the §1983 statutory/person ground and for failure to plead personal involvement; dismissal with prejudice affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (federal courts must give state judgments the same preclusive effect as the rendering state)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleadings must contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim)
- Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state officials sued in their official capacity are not "persons" under §1983)
- McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781 (1997) (determine whether an official is a state or local actor by whether they are final policymakers for local government)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires a policy or custom; no respondeat superior)
- Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) (elements for supervisor liability under §1983)
- Rucker v. Harford Cty., 316 Md. 275 (1989) (Maryland law treating county sheriffs as State officials for many purposes and allocation of liability under state Tort Claims framework)
- Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (seizure under the Fourth Amendment can include dispossession of property during eviction)