26 F. Supp. 3d 875
D. Minnesota2014Background
- Procknow, a parolee with prior convictions, stayed at a hotel under his girlfriend’s reservation but intentionally did not register his presence; Wisconsin issued a fugitive warrant after he absconded from supervision.
- Eagan police, alerted to his possible presence and prior history, located Procknow in the hotel lobby on Aug. 29, 2011; he ran, Ondrey chased and deployed a Taser three times as Procknow fell and was pinned by a door.
- After the Taser deployments, officers allegedly used further force: Procknow claims Curry stomped and kneed his head and Rundquist jumped on and punched him; he lost consciousness and was later photographed and handcuffed.
- Officers obtained Van Krevelen’s room key, entered room 315 without a warrant, photographed items in plain view, then secured the room and later obtained a warrant; evidence from the room formed part of a federal indictment to which Procknow pled guilty but reserved his suppression challenge.
- In the related criminal case, a magistrate judge (adopted by the district judge) denied suppression, finding Procknow had no reasonable expectation of privacy in room 315 (or it terminated upon arrest); Procknow appealed that denial and pled guilty to two counts.
- In this civil action, defendants moved for summary judgment; the court considered collateral estoppel from the criminal suppression ruling, Fourth Amendment search merits, discrimination claims, and excessive-force/assault claims.
Issues
| Issue | Procknow’s Argument | Defendants’ Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discrimination (§1985 and MHRA) | Conspiracy and discrimination occurred during arrest/search | No evidence of class-based animus or membership in protected class | Dismissed — no evidence of class-based animus or protected-class status |
| Unlawful search of room 315 (Fourth Amendment, conspiracy) | Entry and search of room 315 were warrantless and illegal | Prior criminal-court suppression ruling and facts negate a reasonable expectation of privacy; alternatively, search lawful | Dismissed — collateral estoppel bars relitigation; merits also fail (no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy; expectation terminated) |
| Collateral estoppel effect of criminal suppression ruling | Criminal plea undermines preclusive effect; issues not identical/necessarily decided | Suppression was actually litigated and adopted; denial was essential to plea; precludes re-litigating search legality | Preclusion applies — issue was actually litigated, decided, and necessary; alternative-ground ruling treated as preclusive |
| Excessive force / Assault (Taser uses; post-Taser conduct) | Third Taser deployment and subsequent beating occurred after compliance; unlawful force and battery | First two Taser deployments were reasonable given flight, risk, and belief Procknow might be armed; officers entitled to qualified/official immunity | PARTIAL denial: summary judgment granted for first and second Tasers (reasonable); denied for third Taser and alleged subsequent beating — factual disputes preclude immunity and disposition on those claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive-force claims)
- Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (U.S. 1964) (hotel occupants may have legitimate expectation of privacy)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (U.S. 2006) (parolees have diminished Fourth Amendment rights)
- United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010) (must show reasonable expectation of privacy to establish Fourth Amendment search violation)
- Coker v. Arkansas State Police, 734 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2013) (use of force unreasonable where arrestee surrendered and complied)
- Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, 458 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (alternative independently sufficient findings may be given preclusive effect)
- McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2011) (Taser use reasonable to prevent flight where officer perceives risk)
- Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2012) (Taser use reasonable when officer reasonably interprets movement as resistance)
