Prochaska v. Menard, Inc.
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149394
W.D. Wis.2011Background
- Plaintiff Marvin Prochaska, born 1948, began at Menard in 1965 and rose to vice president of real estate.
- Defendant Menard, Inc. promoted Berg to oversee real estate after Prochaska’s termination in 2009.
- Prochaska was 60 when terminated; Collette gave three reasons: list of distressed properties, brochure delay, and lack of travel to sell properties.
- Defendant argues termination for performance; raises and past evaluations are cited as non-discriminatory reasons.
- Court addresses procedural rulings, then analyzes ADEA causation standards and indirect/direct proof frameworks.
- After-acquired evidence of policy violations was offered but not conclusively established; summary judgment denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether age was the but-for cause of termination | Prochaska: age was determinative; but-for standard. | Menard: Gross standard requires no different but-for proof. | But-for standard governs; age must be determinative in the decision. |
| What is the appropriate prima facie framework in the indirect method? | Fourth prong satisfied by replacement by younger worker. | Fourth prong requires similarly situated younger employees or comparable evidence. | Court adopts Reeves/O’Connor approach: focus on replacement by a substantially younger worker. |
| Is there sufficient evidence of pretext to defeat summary judgment? | Defendant's reasons lack coherence and shift over time; raises pretext suggested. | Reasons tied to specific performance issues; consistent with actions. | Yes, genuine issues of material fact on pretext; summary judgment denied. |
| Whether after-acquired evidence bars relief or limits damages | Damages not barred; lack of direct proof that would have terminated earlier. | Evidence could limit relief if severe enough to merit termination at time of discharge. | After-acquired evidence not dispositive; summary judgment on this issue denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (but-for causation framework for ADEA claims)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (indirect method—fourth prong can be satisfied by replacement evidence)
- O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1996) (replacement substantially younger supports fourth prong)
- Pantoja v. American NTN Bearing Manufacturing Corp., 495 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizes evolving, non-rigid prima facie framework; supports Reeves/O’Connor approach)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (classic indirect method framework and pretext inquiry)