Pro's Closet v. City of Boulder
2019 COA 128
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- The Pro’s Closet, an online/warehouse seller of used bicycles in Boulder, was licensed as a secondhand dealer under local ordinances but mainly sells online.
- The Twentieth Judicial District DA instructed Boulder police to treat Pro’s Closet as a “pawnbroker” under Colorado’s pawnbroker statutes, which would, among other things, require holding purchased used property for 30 days before resale instead of 96 hours under local code.
- Pro’s Closet sued for a declaratory judgment that it is not subject to the state pawnbroker statutes; both parties moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding Pro’s Closet regularly makes “purchase transactions” as defined in § 29-11.9-101(8) and thus qualifies as a “pawnbroker” under § 29-11.9-101(7).
- On appeal the Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and affirmed, holding the statute’s disjunctive language covers businesses that regularly make either (1) contracts for purchase or (2) purchase transactions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pro’s Closet is a “pawnbroker” under § 29-11.9-101(7) | Pro’s Closet: only businesses that regularly make “contracts for purchase” qualify; those that only make purchase transactions aren’t pawnbrokers | City: § 29-11.9-101(7) uses disjunctive “or,” so regularly making purchase transactions alone qualifies | Held: A “pawnbroker” includes a person who regularly makes either contracts for purchase or purchase transactions; Pro’s Closet is a pawnbroker because it regularly makes purchase transactions |
| Whether the “purchase transaction” definition should be limited by the common-law meaning of pawnbroker | Pro’s Closet: the term “pawnbroker” in the definitions should be read in its traditional sense to avoid circularity and restrict scope | City: the statutory language is plain and disjunctive; reading “pawnbroker” traditionally would render statutory phrases superfluous | Held: Court rejects Pro’s Closet’s circularity argument and reads “pawnbroker” as a person regularly entering the listed transactions to give effect to all statutory parts |
| Whether broad reading leads to absurd or unintended results | Pro’s Closet: broad application produces absurd results and should be narrowed | City: statute should be enforced as written; breadth alone isn’t absurd | Held: No absurdity shown; court enforces plain statutory text and declines to rewrite statute |
| Whether Colorado secondhand-dealer statutes or local ordinances preempt/override the pawnbroker statutes | Pro’s Closet: secondhand dealer statutes are more specific and should control | City: no irreconcilable conflict; both regimes can be complied with | Held: No irreconcilable conflict; secondhand-dealer statutes do not trump pawnbroker statutes |
Key Cases Cited
- Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565 (Colo. 2008) (disjunctive “or” marks distinctive statutory categories)
- Bloomer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 799 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1990) (legislature’s use of disjunctive indicates different categories)
- Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2011) (apply plain and ordinary meanings when statute is clear)
- Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010) (courts should not rewrite statutes to avoid undesirable results)
- Metal Mgmt. W., Inc. v. State, 251 P.3d 1164 (Colo. App. 2010) (reject narrowing interpretations that undermine legislative intent)